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WHITE (HOUSE) LIES: WHY THE  
PUBLIC MUST COMPEL THE COURTS TO 
HOLD THE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTABLE 
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ABUSES 
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO* 
History teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to "national security" may be 
used to justify a wide variety of repressive government actions.  A blind acceptance by 
the courts of the government's insistence on the need for secrecy, without notice to 
others, without argument, and without a statement of reasons would impermissibly 
compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to possible abuse.1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
"Mission Accomplished," said the huge aircraft carrier banner behind 
President Bush in May 2003 when he announced the United States' victory in 
Iraq.  Six months later, amid intensifying criticism over the rising numbers of 
American deaths and organizational disarray in Iraq, President Bush publicly 
disclaimed that he had ever conveyed that message, saying that the ship's crew 
had hoisted the banner unbeknownst to the administration.  The President's 
people, of course, helped make the banner and approved its placement in the 
news camera's eye to communicate worldwide the very message the President 
later disclaimed.2 
The President told a White (House) lie. 
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 1. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 2. The President's News Conference, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1473 (Oct. 28, 2003).  
President Bush explained that "the 'Mission Accomplished' sign, of course, was put up by the members 
of the USS Abraham Lincoln, saying that their mission was accomplished. I know it was attributed 
some how to some ingenious advance man from my staff."  Id. at 1476; see Elisabeth Bumiller, Keepers 
of Bush Image Lift Stagecraft to New Heights, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at A1 (discussing the Bush 
administration's "use of the powers of television and technology to promote a presidency" through 
choreographed events); see also Dana Bash, White House Pressed on "Mission Accomplished" Sign: 
Navy suggested it, White House made it, both sides say, CNN, Oct. 29, 2003, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/ mission.accomplished/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (on 
file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
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And he did so to minimize mounting political embarrassment over an 
emerging truth of great consequence: his administration clearly lacked a 
realistic, coherent plan for the security and governance of "post-war" Iraq, and 
many Americans and Iraqis were dying as a result.3 
A year later, in an unscripted moment, President Bush conveyed an 
alarming message about what an American is: white in skin color.  He startled 
listeners with his comment that some Iraq reconstruction critics "don't believe 
that people whose skin color may not be the same as ours can be free and self-
govern."4  Leaving aside the self-governance issue, what emerges is a significant 
racial revelation. Conservative commentator George Will observed that the 
President "seemed to be saying that white is, and brown is not, the color of 
Americans' skin."5  The President removed any doubt with his follow-up 
remark, equating "ours" with "white": "I believe that people whose skins . . . 
are a different color from white can self-govern."6 
These are loaded statements by the commander-in-chief of the war on 
terror, a leader charged by critics with unfair racial profiling at home and 
human rights abuses abroad.7  So the President's press secretary Scott 
McClellan, doing damage control, later explained that the President meant only 
that, according to critics, "the people in those Middle Eastern countries cannot 
be free."8  McClellan's "clarification," however, ignored the President's actual 
words and changed what he clearly meant, obscuring the deep racial 
implications of his war on terror.9 
The President's man told another White (House) lie. 
Many have documented this administration's penchant for deliberate 
misrepresentations on national security—in blunt terms, for lying to the 
 
 3. See, Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Bush's Rating Falls to its Lowest Point, New Survey 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A1. 
 4. George F. Will, Time for Bush to See The Realities of Iraq, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at A25 
(emphasis added). 
 5. Id. at A25. 
6.  Id. at A25 (emphasis added). 
 7. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American" and What is Protected 
by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC.  JUST. 23, 40 (2004) 
(critiquing post-9/11 administration anti-terrorism policies, including racial targeting in immigration 
and domestic investigations). 
 8. Will, supra note 4, at A25. 
 9. See Susan M. Akram and Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 302 
(2002) (analyzing the pre-September 11 "demonization" of Arab and Muslims, and the post-September 
11 investigating of Arab and Muslim noncitizens, "with little concern for their civil rights or for the 
potential long-term impacts of that response"); Paul M. Sherer, IMMIG. POL'Y CENTER OF THE AM. 
IMMIG. L. FOUND., TARGETS OF SUSPICION: THE IMPACT OF POST-9/11 POLICIES ON MUSLIMS, 
ARABS AND SOUTH ASIANS IN THE U.S., (2004), at http://www.ilw.com/lawyers/articles/2004,0721-
sherer.shtm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems); see also Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans 
as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing "the 'racing' of Arab Americans as 'terrorists' and the 
use of secret evidence and indefinite detention to deport non-citizens with political views or 
associations the government dislikes" before September 11). 
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American people about threats at home and abroad.10  Some have written about 
other administrations, Democrat and Republican, that have misled the public 
about threats to the nation's safety.11  Fewer have written about who is to hold 
the executive accountable for this dissembling and how this is to be done. 
And what almost no one has closely examined in both jurisprudential and 
Realpolitik terms is this: If the task of holding the executive accountable to 
constitutional standards ultimately falls on the courts, how does the American 
public hold the judiciary accountable—how do we assure that the courts 
actually scrutinize, rather than blindly accept, the executive's proffered 
justification for ostensible national security restrictions of our most basic 
freedoms?  This under-explored question is the focus of this essay, and it opens 
discussion about the strategic need for critical legal advocacy and the 
significance of constructive public pressure on the courts. 
To stimulate that discussion this essay draws a broad "strategic blueprint" 
for building the political coalitions and cultural momentum needed to impel 
close judicial scrutiny of executive national security claims.  The price for failing 
to build those coalitions and that momentum is, I suggest, a weak judiciary, 
unfettered presidential power, and civil liberties disasters in waiting.  The 
proposed blueprint delineates the "who" (a wide array of public advocates 
tasked with pressuring judges, and the legal process itself, to assure executive 
accountability); the "how" (critical legal advocacy coupled with organized 
media and grass roots politicking); and the "what" (judicial acknowledgment 
that law as interpreted and applied is not neutral or objective in controversial 
cases, and that, in a genuine democracy, it is the court's role to carefully 
scrutinize executive national security actions that curtail fundamental liberties). 
II 
EXECUTIVE ABUSES OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: A "STRATEGIC  
BLUEPRINT" FOR "NATIONAL SECURITY" ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Korematsu Revisited: The "Loaded Weapon" in Post 9/11 United States 
During World War II Fred Korematsu challenged the constitutionality of 
the Japanese American internment and lost.  The Supreme Court then blindly 
 
 10. See infra notes 29-40  and accompanying text; see also MINORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 108th CONG., IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ i-ii (Comm. Print 2004) available at 
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/IraqOnTheRecord/pdf_admin_iraq_on_the_record_rep.pdf (last 
visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems) (documenting 237 "specific 
"misleading statements" made President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor 
Condoleeza Rice). 
 11. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK WU, 
RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Aspen 
Publishing Inc. 2001) (showing deliberate misrepresentations by President Roosevelt's Justice and War 
Departments to the Supreme Court about the military necessity basis for the Japanese American 
internment). 
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accepted the Justice and War Departments' false assertion of "military 
necessity."  As was later learned, the executive and military knew then that 
there had been no national security necessity for the mass racial incarceration 
and had lied about it to the public and the courts.12  Justice Jackson, in his 
ringing dissent in Korematsu's case, warned that by deferring to the executive, 
"the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in 
criminal procedure and of transplanting U.S. citizens.  The principle lies about 
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward 
a plausible claim of urgent need."13 
The Executive Branch has worked hard to protect U.S. people and 
institutions.  It also has a long, dark history of dissembling to the American 
people about national security in order to justify what might otherwise be 
unjustifiable.  Some of this dissembling, more than white lies, has had harsh and 
far-reaching consequences—witness the incarceration of 120,000 innocent 
Japanese Americans during World War II, the government's destruction of 
citizens' reputations and lives during the McCarthy communist witch-hunt era,14 
the tens of thousands of American (and Vietnamese) deaths after the 
government's fabrication of low fatality counts to maintain public support for 
the Vietnam war,15 and the politically popular smearing and incarcerating of 
U.S. citizen Wen Ho Lee on trumped-up nuclear espionage claims.16 
And now President Bush and his administration have brought forward many 
"plausible," yet largely false, "claims of urgent need" to justify aggressive 
actions.  The two instances of White House dissembling about national security 
described in the Introduction are the tip of proverbial iceberg—much of the 
danger lies unseen just beneath the surface.  Consider, for example, the 
apparently falsely stated grounds for the post-9/11 indefinite detention of U.S. 
citizen "enemy combatants" Jose Padilla and Yasser Hamdi without charges or 
hearing or access to counsel; the false branding as "terrorists" of all detainees in 
Guantanamo as grounds for indefinite incarceration without charges, access to 
counsel or judicial review; and the government news leaks of falsified claims of 
espionage against Muslim U.S. Military Chaplain James Yee, who ministered to 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees.17 
 
 12. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano and 
Michelle N. Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, 
Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (2003). 
 13. Korematsu, 323 U.S at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 14. See Mari J. Matsuda, McCarthyism, the Internment and the Contradictions of Power, 40 BOST. 
COLL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (discussing the operation and consequences of the repressive power manifest 
in both the Japanese internment and McCarthyism). 
 15. See Steven S. Neff, The United States Military vs. the Media: Constitutional Friction, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 977 (1995) (citing government fabrication of body counts to maintain public support 
for wars and describing the military's use of the media as an offensive weapon). 
 16. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
 17. After first holding him in solitary confinement for seventy-six days, in November 2002 the U.S. 
incarcerated U.S. Captain James Yee in its Guantanomo Bay detention facility for an extended period.  
The government informed the media that Yee, a Chinese American and West Point graduate, was 
guilty of espionage, spying and aiding terrorist enemies.  Oliver Burkeman, He is Not Guilty and He is 
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Consider also the President's unequivocal statements about Iraq's readily 
available weapons of mass destruction as the justification for the U.S. "pre-
emptive" war against Iraq, and the executive foot-dragging in identifying the 
high White House or Cabinet officials who leaked CIA operative Valarie 
Plame's identity as payback for former Ambassador Joseph Wilson's criticism 
of the President's false statement about Iraq's nuclear threat.18 
The Executive Branch needs broad power to defend the country—an 
extraordinarily difficult and demanding task.  At the same time, in a 
constitutional democracy, with a bill of rights, the president's national security 
power cannot encompass the scapegoating and vilification of unpopular groups 
or lying to the public and Congress to legitimate aggression against innocent 
people at home or abroad.  National security abuses of this kind destroy human 
lives and threaten the very fabric of U.S. democracy.  And yet history has 
shown that, unless checked, a president facing a fearful public will find it 
initially politically advantageous to denigrate the civil liberties of those 
characterized as "outsiders" in the U.S.19 
B. Checking the White House: The Judiciary's Complex Role 
The initial question then is who will check the President and his or her 
people?  During a time of national fear, who will hold the Executive 
accountable for its national security abuses or, perhaps more important, prevent 
them from occurring?  More particularly, who will hold the President 
accountable for lies aimed at legitimating or covering up abuses of power? 
There are two quick answers, found in most civics books.  The first is the 
electorate—it can vote out the President at the next election.  But that often is 
years later, and only if it is the President's first term and if executive 
dissembling is publicly revealed and constantly criticized.  The second quick 
answer is the Judiciary.  It is the role of the courts to hold the Executive to 
constitutional dictates.20 
 
Not Innocent, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 30, 2004, at 2.  A Muslim chaplain, Yee had been 
ministering to the Muslim detainees in the war on terror.  News reports trumpeted the government's 
capture of a terrorist collaborator.  Yee maintained complete innocence.  After destroying Yee's 
reputation, the government later charged him only with adultery, lying to investigators and 
downloading pornography—charges dismissed on appeal.  The government produced no evidence of 
espionage or disloyalty.  Yee resigned from the Army, citing his inability to "defend myself against this 
pattern of unfairness" based on false charges "leaked to the media."  Letter from Eugene R. Fidell, 
Attorney for Yee, (Aug. 2, 2004), at http://www.captainyee.org/Press_Release_ 2_Aug_04.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2005) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).  Commenting on the politically 
advantageous (yet misleading) targeting of Yee, Republican and former Georgia Congressman Robert 
Barr observed,  "What we're seeing in Guantanamo, and perhaps in [Yee's] case, is what happens when 
you've removed any judicial oversight over what the government is doing."  Laura Parker, The Ordeal 
of Chaplain Yee, USA TODAY, May 16, 2004, at A1. 
 18. See infra notes 83-86  and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 108-10, 159-60, 239 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the role of the 
judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution). 
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But what is the reality?  The simplistic answer, that the judiciary checks the 
executive, is rooted in a widely-held fallacy—that as a separate co-equal branch 
of government it is politically independent and that its judgments are 
necessarily neutral and objective.  Bush v. Gore21 and Korematsu v. U.S.22 are 
just two of many cases that starkly reveal that fallacy by exposing the political 
underpinnings of judicial decisionmaking in controversial cases.  It is not that 
nine black-robed men and women simply vote their personal and political 
preferences.  The legal method imposes decisional constraints.  To maintain 
public legitimacy judges have to speak in the language of statutes, rules, and 
case precedents.  As many commentators have observed about Bush v. Gore, 
however, the moorings of the legal method are a weak tether in hot political 
cases.23  The intricacies of stare decisis and the complexities of the three-tier 
standard of equal protection review, for instance, are manipulable by 
sophisticated, politically attuned judges.24 
Indeed, across the arc of U.S. legal history, as Justice Jackson's loaded 
weapon warning highlights, the judiciary has exhibited the inclination to twist 
the Bill of Rights and to turn a blind eye to popular executive civil liberties 
abuses during times of national fear, deferring to the executive's unproven 
claims that "national security" justifies its actions.25  But not always.  Sometimes 
courts have fulfilled their role of "watchful care" over fundamental liberties.26  
And at other times, in the very same case opinion, the Supreme Court has 
pronounced the need for heightened judicial scrutiny and then pulled back in its 
actual analysis—as it did in the 2003 "enemy combatant" case, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld. 27  Why the judicial dissonance? 
The judiciary's historic ambivalence toward executive national security 
dissembling is explained in part by the philosophical precept of the "noble 
lie,"28 which, for the Bush administration, seemingly justifies elite policymaker 
lies to the public "for its own good."  It is also explained by the dynamics of 
public advocacy and judicial decisionmaking. 
C. The Significance of Public Pressure and Critical Legal Advocacy 
So the Realpolitik question is, what impels the courts in controversial cases 
to carry out their constitutional duties—to hold the executive accountable for 
 
 21. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 23. See Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 BOST. U. L. REV. 699 (2002) (discussing influence of 
politics on judicial decisions). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (Vintage 
1998) (describing throughout American history the tendency of the courts to defer to the president 
during times of war); Eric L. Muller, All the Themes But One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999) 
(critiquing Chief Justice Rehnquist's book and its historical and jurisprudential omissions); see also 
Section VI infra. 
 26. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. 
 27. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 28. See Section III, infra. 
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oftentimes politically popular excesses?  More particularly, what impels courts 
ruling on national security and civil liberties challenges sometimes to choose 
"heightened scrutiny" of the executive's national security claim, thereby 
requiring the government to seriously account for its actions, rather than (as is 
more often the case) "minimal scrutiny," thereby largely deferring to the 
government's explanation without real proof? 
The crucial judicial choice between heightened or minimal scrutiny—an 
ostensibly neutral aspect of the legal process—is influenced in two related ways.  
First, the choice is partly influenced by established legal methods—case 
precedents and the language of legislative acts.29  Second—and the focus here—
in endeavoring to choose the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, courts will 
often find that the traditional legal method offers considerable "play in the 
joints"—that it does not clearly dictate the "correct" level of scrutiny in 
controversial cases.30  Rather, critical legal advocacy and public pressure about 
the necessity for executive accountability in courts of law, in light of the 
particular controversy, often provide the tipping point. 
As illuminated by the Hamdi and Padilla "enemy combatant" cases and the 
prosecution of Dr. Wen Ho Lee,31 public advocacy emerges in two realms.  The 
first realm is critical legal argument by lawyers and civil and human rights 
organizations aimed at shaping judges' threshold selections of the level of 
judicial scrutiny, and ultimately the judges' responses to the specific legal 
challenges to executive actions.  As a complement to usually narrow traditional 
legal arguments, this kind of critical legal advocacy aims to reveal what is really 
at stake, who benefits and who is harmed (in the short and long term), who 
wields the behind-the-scenes power, which social values are supported and 
which are subverted, how political concerns frame the legal questions, and how 
 
 29. As developed by case law interpreting the Constitution, the traditional legal method provides a 
multi-tiered framework of judicial scrutiny.  If the rights allegedly violated by government are 
"fundamental" (for example, voting, jury trial), or if the government classification targets a "suspect 
group" (one deemed to be a "discreet and insular minority") then the court undertakes "strict scrutiny" 
to determine if the government can show a compelling interest supporting its action and that its chosen 
means are narrowly tailored.  If the rights are important (for example, gender equality) then the court 
undertakes "intermediate scrutiny" to determine if the government can show an important government 
interest in its regulation.  If other rights are involved (for example, economic or property rights) then 
the court undertakes minimalist "rational basis" review—which validates government action as long as 
it has some rational basis.  See YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 11, at 18-20 (describing traditional 
three-tiered standard of judicial review). 
 30. The scholarship of the original legal realists and, more recently, critical legal scholars have 
demonstrated persuasively that, in controversial cases, the traditional legal method is not value-free or 
objective.  See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (Oceana 
Publications 1960) (1930) (describing the importance and limits of the traditional legal method in 
understanding judicial decisionmaking); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 
(1988) (describing legal realists critiques of the traditional legal method and offering a critical theory 
insights into court decisionmaking).  See also Soifer, supra note 23. 
 31. See Sections IV and V, infra. 
13_YAMAMOTO_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:41 AM 
292 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:285 
societal institutions and differing segments of the populace will be affected by 
the court's decision.32 
The second realm of advocacy is a species of public education: journalist 
essays, pundit commentaries, public letters to the editor, clergy sermons, 
scholars' op-ed pieces, community workshops and school forums, all critically 
analyzing and advocating the need for the courts to carefully scrutinize the 
Executive's national security actions.  The goal is to create in the public culture 
a compelling sense that it must be the courts that exercise "watchful care" over 
our constitutional liberties33—that the Executive is charged with protecting our 
people and institutions from threats from without, and in turn that our courts 
are charged with protecting our liberties from threats from our own institutions. 
The timing of both kinds of public advocacy is crucial.  Advocacy of 
accountability is imperative at the "front end" and at the "back end" of 
apparent national security abuses: 
The real bulwark against governmental excess and lax judicial scrutiny, then, is 
political education and mobilization, both at the front end when the laws are passed 
and enforced and at the back end when they are challenged in the courts . . .  
In today's climate of fear and anger, our first task in protecting both people and key 
democratic values is to be pro-active at the front end—to prevent post-modern forms 
of the internment.  We need to organize and speak out to assure that the expansive 
new national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of vulnerable 
groups and move the country toward a police state.  We need to mobilize and raise 
challenges to prevent . . .  secret incarcerations, particularly en masse.  Through 
political analysis, education and activism, our job is to compel powerful institutions, 
particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to "protect all." 
Our second task is to be assertive at the back end—to call out injustice when it occurs, 
to spell out the damage it does to real people in our midst and to our constitutional 
democracy, and to demand accountability to principles of equality and due process.34 
D. Learning from Korematsu: Four Tasks of Judicial Vigilance 
In 1983, aided by a major "back-end" grass-roots political education effort 
and a Congressional study commission, Fred Korematsu reopened his 1944 case 
on the basis of newly discovered World War II documents unequivocally 
showing that the government had lied to the public and the courts about the 
military necessity for the internment.35  A huge struggle among lawyers in the 
 
 32. See, e.g., Tania Cruz, Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil 
Liberties "When Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused," 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 129, 134 (2004) (critically 
examining the political and legal underpinnings of the Bush administration's enemy combatant 
designations). See generally JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR 
A DIVERSE AMERICA (West 2000). 
 33. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall). 2 (1866) (describing the judiciary's role during national 
crisis as one of "watchful care" over fundamental liberties). 
 34. Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27 AMERASIA J. 51, 60 
(2001) 
 35. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings Of Redress and Reparations, 20 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & 
POL'Y. 223, 229 (1992).  The Korematsu coram nobis litigation revealed three extraordinary facts.  
"[F]irst, before the internment, all involved government intelligence services unequivocally informed 
the highest officials of the military and the War and Justice Departments that the West Coast Japanese 
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Justice Department had erupted over whether to tell the Supreme Court the 
truth that there had been no military necessity, or instead to be party to the 
deliberate "suppression of evidence."36  High officials in the Attorney General's 
office chose suppression. 
In ruling on Korematsu's coram nobis petition in 1984, federal judge 
Marilyn Hall Patel declared the original Korematsu v. U.S. case a "manifest 
injustice."  In her ruling, Judge Patel echoed Justice Jackson's "loaded weapon" 
warning forty years earlier about government accountability.  The Korematsu 
injustice 
stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our 
institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees.  It stands as a 
caution that in times of distress the shield of . . . national security must not be used to 
protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability.  It stands as a 
caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms, our institutions, 
legislative, executive and judicial, must . . . protect all citizens from the petty fears and 
prejudices that are so easily aroused.37 
With these cautions in mind for post-September 11 America, the essence of 
Justice Jackson's warning resonates today: How will the courts prevent bald 
Executive claims of "national security" from lying about like a loaded weapon 
aimed at our cherished liberties? 
The complex jurisprudential and Realpolitik approach advanced in this 
essay—organized political pressure coupled with critical legal advocacy—does 
not aim to pressure courts to reach a particular legal result.  Rather, it aims to 
pressure courts to undertake four "process" tasks.  The first is to employ tools 
of critical legal inquiry to unearth and then explain what is really going on in 
the controversy and to articulate what is at stake politically and socially.  The 
second task is for courts to acknowledge that sometimes a presidential 
administration distorts information and even lies to unduly expand its power 
and shield national security abuses from public view.  The third task is for 
courts to recognize that traditional legal analysis, often largely devoid of 
context and visible value judgments, does not itself dictate a politics-free, 
neutral result.  Social value judgments, philosophical commitments, political 
concerns, as well as perceptions of the government's role during hard times, all 
play important parts.  In this light, the final task is for courts to carefully and 
openly scrutinize executive actions with dual goals in mind: to afford the 
Executive broad leeway in its efforts to protect the nation's people, and 
simultaneously to call the Executive to account publicly for apparent 
 
as a group posed no serious danger, and that there exited no justification for mass internment; second, 
the key west coast military commander based his internment decisions on invidious racial stereotypes 
about the inscrutable, inherently disloyal Japanese American; and third, the military, War and Justice 
Departments concealed and destroyed evidence and deliberately misled the Supreme Court in 1944 
when it was considering the Korematsu case and asserted military necessity justification for the 
internment." 
 36. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 37. Id. at 1420. 
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transgressions of civil liberties and human rights under the possibly false mantle 
of national security. 
Only then can the democratic United States genuinely say, "Mission 
Accomplished." 
III 
THE NOBLE LIE 
"White House lies" drive the Bush administration.  Recent books are 
unsparing in advancing this general proposition.  Those books include The 
Book on Bush: How George W. (Mis)Leads America;38 The Lies of George W. 
Bush: Mastering the Politics of Deception;39 and Fraud: The Strategy Behind the 
Bush Lies and Why the Media Didn't Tell You.40  Other major works specifically 
critique the Bush administration's dissembling on the war against Iraq and the 
war on terror, including The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us About Iraq; 41 Hood 
Winked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War; 42 and The 
Exception to the Rulers: Exposing Oily Politicians, War Profiteers and the Media 
That Love Them.43 
Special congressional investigative reports also chronicle the 
administration's misrepresentations about national security and its penchant for 
secrecy and denying public access to information.  Specifically, the 2004 report 
of the House Committee on Government Reform (Special Investigations 
Division, Minority Staff) found that "the five Administration officials most 
responsible for providing public information and shaping public opinion on 
Iraq"44 made "237 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq."45  
Another 2004 congressional investigative committee report documented "a 
consistent pattern in the Administration's undermining of laws . . . designed to 
promote public access to information" and expanding laws "that authorized the 
government to withhold information or to operate in secret."46 
 
 38. ERIC ALTERMAN & ERIC GREEN, THE BOOK ON BUSH: HOW GEORGE W. (MIS)LEADS 
AMERICA (2004). 
 39. DAVID CORN, THE LIES OF GEORGE W. BUSH: MASTERING THE POLITICS OF DECEPTION 
(2003). 
 40. PAUL WALDMAN, FRAUD: THE STRATEGY BEHIND THE BUSH LIES AND WHY THE MEDIA 
DIDN'T TELL YOU  (2004). 
 41. CHRISTOPHER SCHEER ET AL., THE FIVE BIGGEST LIES BUSH TOLD US ABOUT IRAQ (2004). 
 42. JOHN PRADOS, HOOD WINKED: THE DOCUMENTS THAT REVEAL HOW BUSH SOLD US A 
WAR (2004). 
 43. AMY GOODWIN ET AL., THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULERS: EXPOSING OILY POLITICIANS, 
WAR PROFITEERS, AND THE MEDIA THAT LOVE THEM (2004). 
 44. MINORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
REFORM, IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ, 
supra note 10, at i-ii. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MINORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
REFORM, 108th CONG, SECRECY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION iii (2004), available at 
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/secrecy_report/pdf/pdf_secrecy_report.pdf (last visited on 
Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
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According to these and many journalists' accounts,47 White House 
dissembling ranges from white lies, to the apparent fabrication of "facts" so as 
to label people "terrorists" and thus justify either criminal prosecutions or 
indefinite incarcerations,48 to the denials of racial profiling in terror 
investigations49 and post-9/11 immigration policy,50 to misrepresenting terror 
information to a fearful public to maintain support for flagging national security 
policies,51 and to disinformation about weapons of mass destruction in order to 
legitimate what can no longer be called a "pre-emptive" attack on Iraq.52  White 
House communications on national security matters often convey useful and 
accurate information. Yet, at the same time, Bush administration 
misrepresentations on security matters appear to be so numerous and wide-
ranging that their quantity and breadth signal a decided political strategy. 
A. The "Ignoble Lie" 
A key element of the Bush administration's apparent strategy of 
dissembling is philosophical—a belief system that not only legitimates but 
encourages lying to the public "for its own good."53  At the heart of this 
 
 47. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text. 
 48. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. U.S., the FBI announced detailed, personal 
information about Jose Padilla to a hungry press corps.  At the same time, the Justice Department 
admitted that most of its original charges were probably not prosecutable.  See Transcript of News 
Conference on Jose Padilla (June 1, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla. 
transcript/index.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 49. On October 16, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft assured Arab and Muslim leaders that 
their communities would not be discriminated against.  See Terry Frieden, Ashcroft Meets with Muslim, 
Arab Leaders (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/16/ashcroft.arab.meet/index.html (last 
visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). Yet, the National Special Entry 
and Exit Registration System (NSEERS), whose purpose was to weed out foreigners who posed 
potential national security concerns listed twenty-four Arab or Muslim countries out of twenty-five 
total countries.  See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Prepared Remarks on the 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 50. See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 40581 (proposed 
June 13, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214 & 264) (applying post-9/11 registration and 
monitoring rules only to nonimmigrant aliens of selected countries). 
 51. For example, the State Department acknowledged that data in its Patterns of Global Terrorism 
in 2003 report was "incomplete and in some cases incorrect" and that it "did not check and verify the 
data sufficiently."  The Department admitted that "the figures for the number of attacks and casualties 
will be up sharply from what was published."  Press Statement, State Department, Corrections to 
Patterns of Global Terrorism Will Be Issued (June 10, 2004), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ 
prs/ps/2004/33433.htm (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 52. CIA investigator Joseph Wilson reported that it was highly unlikely that any uranium 
transaction had taken place. See Associated Press, Reports Bolster Bush Iraq-Uranium Claim (July 18, 
2004), at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5458642/ (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). Yet, the President asserted that Saddam Hussein was negotiating to procure 
an African uranium source.  See Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 109 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
 53. Michael Lind observes, "The neocons took advantage of Bush's ignorance and inexperience."  
Michael Lind, How Neoconservatives Conquered Washington—and Launched a War (April 10, 2003), 
at www.antiwar.com/orig/lind1.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems).  Although it is unclear to what extent the neoconservatives control the administration, their 
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philosophy, reportedly embraced by key neoconservatives in the Bush 
administration, is the "noble lie."54  Journalist Earl Shorris links the thinking of 
philosopher Leo Strauss to the Bush administration and its "philosophy of mass 
deception."55  He observes that Strauss and his disciples provided the Bush 
regime with "a philosophy of the noble lie, the conviction that lies, far from 
being simply a regrettable necessity of political life, are instead virtuous and 
noble instruments of wise policy."56 
The virtuousness of the lie "depends on who is doing the lying."57  The 
underlying tenet is that the elite in society are the "wise," that "the wise should 
rule," and that Machiavellian deception is an instrument of wise policy.  The 
"noble lie" philosophy thus produces two sets of truth-telling rules—one for 
those at the top rung of political power and another for the rest of the public.  
By definition, then, lies by "wise" elite rulers for the benefit of the public (as 
well as the rulers) are not open to criticism.  The rulers know best.  Indeed, 
criticism of public lies damages their ability to rule wisely.  Those at the top 
suffer damage to their legitimacy when lies are exposed because much of the 
American public, Republicans and Democrats, bolstered by the core of the 
First Amendment, still wants to believe that its government speaks truthfully. 
Hence, the conundrum of the noble lie: How can America's leaders at the 
highest levels dissemble to garner and maintain support for their larger political 
agenda without being held publicly accountable for doing so?  In light of this 
conundrum, noble lies—the "virtuous instruments of wise policy"—gain 
legitimacy only through an ineffectual mainstream media that soft-pedals 
contemporaneous investigation and reporting. 
B. Media Maladies 
Therefore, a second key element of the White House's dissembling strategy 
is media complicity—or at least the "media's lack of democratic 
accountability."58  Conservative daily news sources, like the news stations 
controlled by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation (notably Fox News), and 
periodicals and journals on current legal affairs, like the Weekly Standard, 
National Review and the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy have been 
slow to seriously investigate and critique executive national security 
pronouncements that now appear to have been misleading if not deliberately 
 
influence is substantial.  See Paul Richter, The Nation; A Tough Time for "Neocons," L.A. TIMES, June 
10, 2004, at A1 (noting that the President's speeches are "no less neocon than ever"). 
 54. The "noble lies" discussion draws on Dina Shek's research and writing. 
 55. Earl Shorris, Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George Bush, and the Philosophy of Mass Deception, 
HARPER'S MAG., June 1, 2004, at 65. 
 56. Id. at 68. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Eric Alterman, Think Again: Boston 2004: The Media's Missed Opportunity (Aug. 5, 2004), 'at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=135223 (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) 
(on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
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false.59  At times journalists from some of these organizations sound more like 
government public relations spinners than independent commentators.  At a 
minimum, as conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks 
acknowledges, the conservative media have "cohered to form a dazzlingly 
efficient ideology delivery system that swamps liberal efforts to get their ideas 
out."60 
The mainstream media, too, has largely failed in timely investigating and 
reporting on apparent government national security lies.  Unlike the Vietnam 
War era, when reporting by established journalists "on the ground" eventually 
countered much of the government's war propaganda, today we have 
government-chosen "embedded" journalists and national news anchors 
proclaiming full deference to the President.61  Many formerly independent 
media outlets are now controlled by mega-media corporations,62 and other 
established news reporting powers appear initially reluctant to levy even 
modest criticism of the President's national security actions.63  Indeed, more 
than a year after the war against Iraq began, the New York Times published a 
mea culpa—effectively apologizing for its loose and uncritical reporting of the 
Bush administration's apparently false factual claims in support of the war.64 
 
 59. See generally DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE: RIGHT-WING MEDIA AND 
HOW IT CORRUPTS DEMOCRACY (Crown Publishers 2004) (former conservative "attack dog" turned 
critic of the right-wing's use of the media to distort information presented to the public). 
 60. Id. at 9 (quoting David Brooks on the conservative media). 
 61. CBS news anchor Dan Rather publicly stated on September 17, 2001: "George Bush is the 
president.  He makes the decisions, and, . . . wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me where.  And 
he'll make the call."  See Peter Hart & Seth Ackerman, Patriotism & Censorship (Dec. 2001), at 
http://www.fair.org/extra/ 0111/patriotism-and-censorship.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems).  In response to criticism, some news outlets later undertook 
critical examination of the President's national security actions.  CBS in September 2004 reported 
military documents showing President Bush evaded active military service.  See Marc Ash, Editorial, 
Bush v. Rather et. al. (Sept. 20, 2004) (discussing and the impact and merit of the reported documents), 
at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/25/6356 (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems).  Shortly thereafter, however, CBS acknowledged that key 
documents were falsified.  See Amity Shlaes, How Iraq Has Put a New Spin on the Vietnam War, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 21, 2004, at C25 (contrasting the falsified documents to the use by the media of John 
Kerry's Vietnam war record). 
 62. In 2003 the Federal Communications Commission relaxed its rules enabling more "cross-
ownership" of media outlets in a single market.  See PBS, NOW with Bill Moyers, Media Ownership 
Rule Changes (June 6, 2003), at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/fccchanges.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 
2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).  Mass media conglomerate Clear Channel, which 
owns 1,200 radio stations, funded and organized pro-war rallies after the Bush administration's 
retaliatory actions.  See Oliver Burkeman, Bush Backer Sponsoring Pro-War Rallies, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED (Mar. 26, 2003), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/ Story/0,2763,922040,00.html (last 
visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).  On April 20, 2004, media 
conglomerate Sinclair Broadcast Group censored ABC's Nightline broadcast of reading the names of 
all the U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq.  Bill Carter, Some Stations to Block "Nightline" War Tribute, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 30, 2004, at A13. 
 63. See generally BROCK, supra  notes 59-60. There is a rise of alternative media outlets including 
truthout.org, and radio shows like Democracy Now and Air America Radio.  Id.; see Brock, supra note 
59. 
 64. See Editorial, A Pause for Hindsight, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at A1 ("Over the last few 
months, this page has repeatedly demanded that President Bush acknowledge the mistakes his 
administration made when it came to the war in Iraq, particularly its role in misleading the American 
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According to media observer Eric Alterman, this skewing of the 
informational picture transmitted to the public undermines American 
democracy.65  For Alterman, even worse than simply failing to take its 
responsibility to democracy seriously, the mainstream media has facilitated the 
distortion of public information. 
This media's ["three major television networks"] lack of democratic accountability 
adds an element of hearsay and abstraction to the political process that is funneled 
down through the fabric of our society, distorting the message and creating a confused 
political climate in which voters are left with the spin, but without the facts.66 
The Bush administration's "ignoble lying" about national security, 
buttressed by a sometimes complicit media, takes many forms, including 
specific government misrepresentations and distortions in the cases of Padilla, 
Hamdi, and Wen Ho Lee, and the corresponding need for careful judicial 
scrutiny (examined below in Sections IV and V).  Other aspects of the 
administration's national security dissembling warrant general mention here.  
Those aspects fall roughly into three categories, "Misleading Americans to 
Maintain Support for Failing or Abusive National Security Actions," 
"Dissembling to Create a Culture of Fear," and "Stifling Dissent."  All three 
raise the looming issue of executive accountability during times of national fear. 
C. Misleading Americans in Order to Maintain Support for Failing or Abusive 
National Security Actions 
Neoconservative author Michael Ledeen describes the "noble lie" 
philosophy.  His book Machiavelli on Modern Leadership,67 distributed "to 
Members of Congress attending a political strategy meeting,"68 cites the 
necessity and virtue of public lies.  Ledeen's work observes that "[l]ying is 
central to the survival of nations and to the success of great enterprises, because 
if our enemies can count on the reliability of everything you say, your 
vulnerability is enormously increased."69  In addition to misleading the 
American public about "weapons of mass destruction" to gain support for the 
 
people about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and links with Al Qaeda.  If we want Mr. 
Bush to be candid about his mistakes, we should be equally open about our own. . . . [E]ven though this 
page came down against the invasion, we regret now that we didn't do more to challenge the 
president's assumptions."). 
 65. See Alterman supra note 58 ("A healthy and functioning democracy must rely on the free flow 
of information between citizens in the public sphere, and our representative system can only truly fulfill 
its promise when the media takes seriously its responsibility as the primary facilitator of this 
exchange.") 
 66. Id. 
 67. MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, MACHIAVELLI ON MODERN LEADERSHIP: WHY MACHIAVELLI'S 
IRON RULES ARE AS TIMELY AND IMPORTANT TODAY AS FIVE CENTURIES AGO (St. Martin Press 
1999). 
 68. Congressman Ron Paul, Neo-CONNED!, (July 10, 2003) (noting distribution of Ledeen's book 
to Congressional members) at http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2003/cr071003.htm (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2005) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems); see LEDEEN, supra note 67. 
 69. LEDEEN, supra note 67. 
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war against Iraq, the "noble lie" supports dissembling to soldiers to induce 
them to go to war because 
[d]ying for one's country doesn't come naturally.  Modern armies, raised from the 
populace, must be inspired, motivated, indoctrinated.  Religion is central to the 
military enterprise, for men are more likely to risk their lives if they believe they will 
be rewarded forever after for serving their country.70 
The pressure to distort factual information in order to support the 
administration's national security policies also reaches deep into executive 
intelligence-gathering and analysis.  Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest's article 
The Lie Factory reports on a "shadow agency" that subverts much of the CIA's 
intelligence to President Bush.  According to State Department intelligence 
analysts, pressure by administration intermediaries "was being put on them to 
shape intelligence to fit policy."71  According to Dreyfuss and Vest, 
neoconservative scholar Edward Luttwak goes further and 
says flatly that the Bush administration [before the 2003 attack on Iraq] lied about the 
intelligence it had because it was afraid to go to the American people and say that the 
war was simply about getting rid of Saddam Hussein.  Instead, says Luttwak, the 
White House was groping for a rationale to satisfy the United Nations' criteria for 
war.72 
In 2004, seven weeks before the presidential election, former military 
leaders and military experts charged the Bush administration with deliberately 
misleading the American public after the Iraq invasion by stating that the 
United States was winning the post-war.  More specifically, those former 
generals and military observers sharply criticized the administration's 
downplaying of the accelerating Iraqi insurgency that was destabilizing Iraq's 
political and economic structure and threatening to scuttle January elections, 
ignoring the real possibility of an Iraqi civil war, dismissing the reality that 
America's continuing presence in Iraq is intensifying danger to the United 
States by breeding many new anti-American insurgents, and denying the real 
likely future costs to Americans in dollars and lives.  At bottom, the critics 
observed that the administration was deliberately painting a misleading picture 
of post-war Iraq, a picture unrelated to what had been actually happening "on 
the ground."73 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Robert Dreyfuss & Jason Vest, The Lie Factory, MOTHER JONES, Jan., 2004, (referring to State 
Department Intelligence officials Greg Thielmann and Christian Westermann), available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2004/01/12_405.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Sidney Blumenthal, Far Graver than Vietnam: Most Senior US Military Officers Now Believe 
the War on Iraq Has Turned into a Disaster on an Unprecedented Scale, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Sept. 
16, 2004) (quoting military former military leaders and experts), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
comment/story/0,3604,1305360,00.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
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D. Dissembling to Maintain a Culture of Fear 
More than any other administration in recent memory, the Bush 
administration has strategically employed the noble lie to sustain a politics of 
fear.  The administration has done this to keep raw the public's fear of another 
9/11 to garner support for its national security actions.  Jack M. Balkin observes 
that the Bush administration "justifies its actions not by giving us freedom from 
fear but by spreading fear."74  Balkin asserts that the administration, to avoid 
accountability, "raises the specter of grave dangers to our national security, 
from which it will save us if only we submit ourselves willingly to its greater 
wisdom."75 
As much as to forewarn and prepare the public, key administration 
statements appear to be calculated to maintain a fearful public.76  One form of 
these efforts is the press conference that warns of imminent domestic attacks 
but cites no specific threats or new intelligence on terror.  Two vague yet 
nevertheless anxiety-inducing government press conferences in mid-2004 are 
illustrative: 
On May 26, 2004, U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Muller 
held a press conference to inform the public that intelligence from multiple 
sources indicated that Al Qaeda intended to attack the United States in the 
coming months.77  At the press conference they "revealed" the identities of 
seven of the terrorists involved.  It turns out that six of the men had been 
identified one month earlier without fanfare by the Justice Department.  The 
press conference also lacked attack specifics—"how," "where" or "when."  The 
press conference's tone nevertheless implied that attacks were imminent.  
Belying immediacy, though, the Homeland Security Department's medium 
color-threat-level remained unchanged. 
At first glance, the timing, substance and tone of the warning seemed 
peculiar.  Its underlying and apparently diversionary purpose emerged in the 
light of the political setting.  The vague terror attack warning to Americans 
came amid intensifying international criticism of American human rights abuses 
in Abu Ghraib prison.78 
 
 74. Jack Balkin, Editorial, Who's Next?, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 20, 2002, at A9 
(emphasis added). 
 75. Id. (emphasis added); see also Shorris, supra note 58, at 68. 
 76. President Bush stated, "In order to secure the country, we must do everything in our power to 
find these killers and bring them to justice before they hurt us again.  I'm afraid they want to hurt us 
again.  They're still there."  The President's News Conference, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 580 
(Apr.13, 2004). Justice Department Spokesman Mark Corallo warned, "This country has become a 
battlefield, and (terrorists) will kill us anywhere they can."  Rick Montgomery, Judges Beginning to 
Balk on Terror, (Dec. 29, 2003) (emphasis added), available at www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/ 
nation/7585416.htm (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 77. Transcript: Ashcroft, Muller News Conference (May 26, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
US/05/26/terror.threat.transcript/index.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 78. See, e.g., Rupert Cornwell, Iraq in Crisis: US Military Iraq Torture Pictures Spark Outrage 
Across the World, THE INDEPENDENT, May 1, 2004, at 4 (London); Russell Thirgood, Iraqi Atrocities a 
Blight on Our Values, COURIER MAIL, June 14, 2004, at 13 (Queensland, Australia). 
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Similarly, in July 2004, Homeland Security Secretary Ridge announced that 
Al Qaeda was planning to attack targets in the United States, including Citicorp 
Plaza.  The intelligence Secretary Ridge relied on, however, dated back to 2000, 
prior to the 9/11 attacks.  When challenged about the staleness of the 
intelligence and the timing of Ridge's new fear-inducing warning—days before 
the Democratic National Convention—members of the Bush administration 
dismissed the questions as nonsense 79 
For Professor Harold Hongju Koh, the administration's fear-based 
approach to national security has not only unnecessarily damaged the American 
psyche, it has also "placed startling pressure on the structure of human-rights 
and international law."80  Koh recalls President Roosevelt's post-World War II 
framework for human rights that embraced four fundamental freedoms: 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from 
fear.  Koh suggests that the "emerging Bush doctrine" has reprioritized 
"freedom from fear" to make it the freedom most in need of preservation.  The 
result of this change is not only a more fearful public but also government 
human rights policy with five oppressive faces: the closing of government and 
the invasion of privacy, the scapegoating of immigrants and refugees, the 
creation of extra-legal zones (where government can operate without legal 
accountability), the creation of extra-legal persons (who have no judicial 
recourse), and the reduced American human rights presence abroad.81 
E. Stifling Dissent 
In addition to profiting from a culture of fear, another Machiavellian aspect 
of the noble lie is the ruler's need—and right—to squelch open criticism as a 
way of avoiding public accountability.82  A poignant illustration is the White 
House's punitive "outing" of undercover CIA agent Valarie Plame in 
retaliation for her spouse's sharp criticism of the President.  Plame's husband, 
former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Joseph Wilson, had criticized the President for 
wrongly stating in his State of the Union address that Saddam Hussein was in 
the process of obtaining nuclear-weapons grade uranium from Niger.83 
In apparent retaliation, two "high officials" from the Bush administration 
leaked to conservative columnist Robert Novak that Plame was an undercover 
CIA agent and that she had recommended Wilson for the Niger investigation.84  
Rather than refute Wilson's statement, those administration officials tried to 
 
 79. Treasury Secretary John Snow said "suggestions that terror alerts were manipulated were 
'pure, unadulterated nonsense.'"  Vice President Dick Cheney "'lashed out at those who have implied 
that the terror alerts were at all politically motivated.'" Administration Decries Suggestion Terror Alert 
Was Issued For Political Purposes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 5, 2004), at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/ bulletin/archive/bull040805i.htm (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004). 
 80. Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at 7. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Shorris, supra note 58, at 70. 
 83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 84. Robert Novak, Editorial, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 31. 
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discredit Wilson with a charge of cronyism.  More important, they destroyed 
Plame's capacity to function as an undercover CIA agent.  And through what 
was apparently an illegal "outing," they placed her and her operatives in 
potentially life-threatening danger.  President Bush, Attorney General Ashcroft 
and others in the administration then stalled the ensuing criminal 
investigation.85  In this way, when called to account for an "ignoble lie," the 
administration powerfully conveyed its counter-message to government 
insiders: Do not accuse the President of misleading the public on national 
security, or else.86 
F. Summary 
Much of the national security information conveyed by the President's 
administration to the public is accurate.  Much of it, however, is not.  Indeed, 
some of that information, on important matters, is deliberately misleading.  
And that dissembling does not flow from inadvertence or honest mistake.  
Rather, it appears to emerge from a deliberate strategy.  The "noble lie," when 
backed by a complicit mainstream media, has real consequences.  It allows an 
administration "in good conscience" to mislead Americans to maintain support 
for failing or abusive national security actions, to dissemble to sustain a culture 
of fear to garner support for controversial government plans, and to stifle 
dissent challenging the Executive's national security claims. 
The next two sections examine in depth three national security–civil 
liberties cases (before and after September 11) that illuminate the dynamic of 
Executive dissembling at both the law enforcement and policy-making levels.  
The stark circumstances of those cases and the government's machinations to 
avoid accountability highlight the need for critical legal advocacy and organized 
public pressure in calling for heightened judicial scrutiny.  They also reveal why 
executive accountability for "ignoble lies" during times of national stress is 
simultaneously imperative and illusive. 
 
 85. See JOHN DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. 
BUSH 173 (Little, Brown and Co. 2004) ("A much-rumored source of the leak has been Karl Rove, 
who was a consultant to Ashcroft during one or more of his political campaigns and the person many 
believe secured Ashcroft his post as Attorney General.  For this reason, as soon as the investigation 
commenced, there were demands that Ashcroft either appoint a special counsel or recuse himself.  He 
stalled as long as possible before finally giving way, sending more signals that he did not want this 
investigation to get out of hand.").  The President stated early on that an investigation might not 
uncover the truth.  See Peter Brownfield, Leak Investigations Rarely Successful (Oct. 16, 2003), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100403,00.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 86. John Dean suggests the administration may yet be called to account for its retaliatory actions: 
"The federal law of conspiracy, along with the federal laws dealing with the obstruction of justice, are 
among the most far-reaching of the federal criminal laws.  Whether they know it or not, the Bush II 
White House—given this active and ongoing criminal activity—has dangers it has never dreamed 
possible by not ending this matter itself."  DEAN,  supra note 85, at 176. 
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IV 
THE WEN HO LEE PROSECUTION:  
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, OR AN OPEN DOOR FOR ABUSE 
The Wen Ho Lee prosecution offers both exemplary and cautionary 
examples of judicial scrutiny in national security controversies—especially those 
infused with racial fears.  Dr. Lee's case falls within a long line of prosecutions 
in which the Executive Branch dissembles and then demands that the courts 
defer to Executive's claim of national security.87  Dr. Lee's prosecution also 
illuminates the strategic importance of critical legal advocacy and organized 
public pressure in compelling judges to call the executive to account for 
apparent national security abuses of civil liberties.  Anthony Lewis aptly 
describes the stakes in this executive-courts-public drama: "The 
[administration's] attempt to avoid any meaningful review by the courts is 
especially alarming.  Judges are the last line of defense for citizens against abuse 
of government power."88 
A. The Prosecution (Persecution) of Wen Ho Lee 
In December 1999 the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Dr. Wen 
Ho Lee after nearly a year of intrusive interrogations, private harassment and a 
disparaging public media campaign fueled by FBI and Justice Department 
leaks.  The Department charged Dr. Lee with fifty-nine felony counts, including 
violations of the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Espionage Act.89  It 
accused Dr. Lee, an employee of the government's Los Alamos Lab, of stealing 
the "crown jewels" of America's nuclear secrets—the design of America's W-88 
miniaturized nuclear warhead—and delivering those secrets to China's 
scientists.  The sixty-five-year-old Lee suffered nine months of solitary 
confinement, without needed medications, often with wrists and ankles 
shackled. 
Earlier, in 1999, the Albuquerque FBI had sought to close its five-year 
investigation of Dr. Lee, informing Washington D.C. headquarters that Dr. Lee 
 
 87. See infra notes 194-201, 215. 
 88. Anthony Lewis, One Liberty at a Time, MOTHER JONES, May, 2004, (commenting on the then-
pending enemy combatant detention cases), available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/ 
2004/05/04_ 403.html (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 89. In Dr. Lee's own words: 
Even though I was not being charged with espionage, all the charges were wrapped up in the 
insinuation that I had acted in a nefarious, deceptive, and sinister manner—like a spy.  The 
government told reporters that they so far had found no evidence that I gave the tapes to a 
foreign country, . . .  [Yet] [o]ne unnamed official even told the Wall Street Journal that 
espionage "is the only logical reason why that quantity of information [would] be 
downloaded." 
WEN HO LEE & HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME: THE FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT BY THE LOS 
ALAMOS SCIENTIST WHO WAS FALSELY ACCUSED 205-06 (Hyperion 2001).  Dina Shek's research 
and writing contributed substantially to the Wen Ho Lee analysis. 
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was no longer an espionage suspect.90  How could the Justice Department 
justify its prosecution in 2000? 
The Clinton administration did so by telling a series of lies to Dr. Lee, the 
courts, and the public.  For instance, the FBI lied about Dr. Lee's failing 
polygraph tests, the Justice Department dissembled about the classified status 
of materials downloaded by Dr. Lee on his computer, and CIA former 
counterintelligence chief Paul Redmond claimed, without evidence, that "[t]his 
was far more damaging to the national security than Aldrich Ames."91  The 
government leaked to a hungry media false stories of Lee's theft of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons program "crown jewels."  "Alarmist" media stories then 
played to popular racial fears to portray Dr. Lee as an "evil Chinese spy."92  The 
leaked public lies enabled a Democratic administration, which was the target of 
conservative attacks for its "softness" in foreign affairs, to project itself as 
"tough on Communist China" and national security.93 
From jail, Dr. Lee sought not only to defend against the substantive charges, 
but he also asked the court to compel the government to disclose evidence 
relating to selective racial prosecution.  After careful consideration, Federal 
District Judge Parker ordered the Justice Department to produce documents 
relating to Lee's charge. 
Two days before the deadline for government compliance with the judge's 
disclosure order, the Justice Department capitulated.  Dr. Lee pled guilty to a 
single felony count of unauthorized possession of documents relating to 
national defense.  The government agreed to drop the remaining fifty-eight 
charges.  Dr. Lee pled guilty to actions no worse than those committed by 
hundreds of other white American government employees (who were never 
prosecuted), including then CIA Director John Deutch, who admitted to 
 
 90. On January 23, 1999, after intense and intimidating FBI interrogations, the Albuquerque FBI 
sent a memo to Washington, D.C. headquarters saying that Dr. Lee was not a spy and recommending 
the FBI close its investigation.  Id. at 46. 
 91. James Risen & Jeff Gerth, Breach at Los Alamos: A Special Report.; China Stole Nuclear 
Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1.  In 1994, Aldrich Ames, a CIA 
counterintelligence official, pled guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment for spying for the Soviet 
Union from 1985 to 1994.  According to a Guardian article, "He is blamed for the deaths of at least 
nine U.S. agents in the Soviet Union, and for disclosing U.S. counterintelligence techniques."  Spy 
Cases in the United States, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (England & Wales), Aug. 28, 2004. 
 92. Dr. Lee's neighbors recount stories that "the news media stalked the neighborhood, looking 
for people who would tell them 'Wen Ho Lee, evil spy' stories" while refusing to listen when they 
spoke of "Wen Ho Lee, good neighbor and family man."  LEE, supra note 89, at 146. 
 93. The public exposure and persecution of Dr. Lee began on the heels of nearly two years of the 
Clinton/Gore administration's "campaign finance scandal."  This Republican-led attack employed 
accusations including over-reaching attempts to link Chinese American campaign fundraisers to 
Chinese espionage.  See James Risen, Nuclear Secrets: Links; Fund-Raising Figure Had Spy Case Role, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A1.  Rather than criticize the racist overtones of the Republican 
accusations, Democratic legislators and the Clinton administration capitalized on the convenient target 
of "the Chinese spy case" to both deflect attention from the campaign finance scandal and to appear 
tough on China.  Bill Mesler, The Spy Who Wasn't: National Insecurity State; Allegations That Wen Ho 
Lee Was a Spy Are Not Likely To Be Proven, THE NATION, Aug. 9, 1999, at 13. 
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downloading unsecure files onto his home computer.94  Dr. Lee spent nine 
months in solitary confinement tagged as an evil spy.  By contrast, Deutch faced 
only a misdemeanor charge, was never prosecuted and, in the end, received a 
full pardon. 
Even a cursory look at the case timeline shows that the threatened exposure 
of racial profiling pressured the government to plea-bargain the case.  Early on 
the racial profiling charges by advocates and journalists stirred little response.95  
The eve-of-disclosure timing of Dr. Lee's unconditional release—after two 
years of government portrayals as the worst spy since the Rosenbergs—
indicated that the Justice Department and the FBI, particularly, had something 
to hide.96 
Former Chief Counterintelligence Officer of Los Alamos National Labs 
(LANL) Robert Vrooman, who initially headed the Lee investigation, declared 
in a court filing that FBI spokesperson Messemer "regularly distorts" and 
"deliberately mischaracterize[s]" information.  More important, Vrooman 
stated that "[d]ozens of individuals who share those characteristics were not 
chosen for investigation. . . . It is my opinion that the failure to look at the rest 
of the population is because Lee is ethnic Chinese."97  He directly challenged 
any government argument for racial profiling by saying, "I am unaware of any 
empirical data that would support any inference that an American citizen born 
in Taiwan would be more likely [to spy for China] than any other American 
citizen."  Former Acting Director of Counterintelligence at the U.S. 
Department of Energy Charles E. Washington similarly stated, "I believe that 
[investigator] Mr. Trulock improperly targeted Dr. Lee due to Dr. Lee's race 
 
 94. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 11, at 465. 
 95. See Mesler, supra note 93, at 13; Editorial, The weak case against Wen Ho Lee, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, August 4, 1999, at A22; Angela E. Oh, Editorial, Spy Charges Fueled Search for Scapegoats; 
Asian Americans: The Coverage of the Cox Report on Chinese Espionage Has Unfairly Tainted The 
Image of All, LA TIMES, June 21, 1999, at B5; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Discovery of Materials Related to Selective Prosecution, filed by Asian Law Caucus, U.S. v. Wen 
Ho Lee, No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 2000), available at http://wenholee.org//Amicus.doc (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 96. On August 25, 2000, Judge Parker granted Dr. Lee's motion for discovery of materials related 
to selective prosecution.  The Judge set a deadline of September 15 when the government was to 
produce numerous significant documents.  These crucial documents included DOE reports on racial 
profiling, FBI training videos, and transcripts and statements by Notra Trulock and other key DOJ, 
DOE, and FBI officials relating to Dr. Lee and the Kindred Spirit investigation.  U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee, 
No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 25, 2000) (order related to Defendant's "Motion for Discovery of 
Materials Related to Selective Prosecution"), available at http://www.wenholee.org (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems).  For the first time during his case, the prosecution entered into earnest 
negotiations.  Between August 25 and September 12, prosecutors and defense attorneys met three 
times.  Finally, on September 13—just two days before the government was to produce documents 
related to selective prosecution—Dr. Lee pleaded guilty to a single count of "unauthorized possession 
of and control over documents and writings relating to the national defense" and walked out of the 
courthouse a free man.  LEE, supra note 89, at 314. 
 97. Declaration of Robert Vrooman, U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee , No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 10, 
2000), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/vrooman.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
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and national origin."98  Like Vrooman, Washington offered, "I am unaware of 
any empirical data that would support a claim that Chinese-Americans are 
more likely to commit espionage than other Americans." 
Indeed, Harry Brandon, former FBI head of counterintelligence, conceded 
that "critics say our government is racist because the government is targeting 
Chinese-Americans because they are Chinese. . . . And the answer is, [y]es, we 
are targeting them, because they are targets (of Beijing)"99—which made little 
sense in Dr. Lee's case since Taiwan (his country and origin) and China are 
bitter foes.  Paul Moore, Deputy Director of the FBI acknowledged more 
generally that, "there is racial profiling based on ethnic background, asserting 
that  "[t]he FBI applies a profile[;] . . . so do other agencies who do counter 
intelligence investigations."100  Collectively, these tantalizing public statements 
suggested incriminating documentary evidence of racial prosecution in the 
government's files. 
In September 2000 Judge Parker, a Reagan appointee, accepted Dr. Lee's 
plea and released him from jail.  In an extraordinary gesture, Judge Parker 
apologized to Dr. Lee from the bench, expressing distress at being misled by the 
Justice Department, including the FBI and U.S. Attorney. 
I am truly sorry that I was led by our Executive Branch of government to order your 
detention last December.  Dr. Lee, I tell you with great sadness that I feel I was led 
astray last December by the Executive Branch of our government through its 
Department of Justice, by its Federal Bureau of Investigation and by its United States 
Attorney for the District of New Mexico . . . .101 
Based on government leaks and early frenetic media reporting, and without 
a court hearing, the public had presumed Dr. Lee's guilt.  Dr. Lee's legal 
counter-charge of selective racial prosecution and, over time, strong public 
commentary by civil rights, scientific and ethnic communities across the country 
helped remake public perceptions.  The New York Times, for example, shifted 
its rhetoric from 'the worst spy case since the Rosenbergs" to an admission of 
its own flaws and an apology for the "alarmist" tone of its reporting.102 
 
 98. Declaration of Charles E. Washington, U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee,No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 
2000), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/washington.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
 99. Jeff Stein, Espionage Without Evidence, August 26, 1999 at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/ 
1999/08/26/china/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 100. Theodore Hsien Wang and Frank H. Wu, Singled Out, Based on Race, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 
2000, at. A25 ("Moore justified this practice on grounds that foreign countries tend to target ethnic 
Americans with ancestry ties.  When confronted with Moore's statements in court, Lee's prosecutors 
have continued to argue that federal law enforcement agencies should be allowed to consider race as a 
factor in identifying espionage suspects.  Their rationale for this targeting is that China seeks to recruit 
spies from among Chinese Americans."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Discovery, U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee, No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 25, 2000), available at 
http://archive.aclu.org/court/wenholee_amicus.html. 
 101. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Lee , No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Sept. 13, 2000) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/14/national/14LTEX.html?ex= 
1106888400&en=ef3b7dd76ad925bf&ei=5070&oref=login (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems) 
 102. From the Editors: The Times and Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A2 (apologizing 
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Dr. Lee's victory was tempered, however, by the reality that the case settled 
without government accountability.  The Justice Department denied 
wrongdoing in Lee's prosecution while continuing to shield evidence that might 
have revealed the government's race-based selective prosecution.  No one from 
the Department acknowledged the national security lies or the harm they 
caused Dr. Lee and Chinese Americans generally. 
B. Administration Attempts to Avoid Close Court Scrutiny 
Dr. Lee's prosecution embodied a classic tension between the Judiciary and 
the Executive.  The government first tried to avoid close judicial scrutiny of its 
espionage claims and of Dr. Lee's counter-charge of selective prosecution by 
maintaining that "the world's strategic balance" was at stake.103  In terms 
reminiscent of the government's attempt to justify Japanese American 
internment during World War II, FBI agent Messemer testified at a pre-trial 
hearing that it was important to continue Lee's incarceration, even without 
evidence of disloyalty, because, if he were actually innocent, he might now try 
to exact revenge on the United States for his persecution.104  For nine months, 
the court accepted the government's national security assertions. 
The government also sought to avoid accountability by vigorously opposing 
Dr. Lee's motion for disclosure of prosecution documents.  Its position 
amounted to more than ordinary legal argument.  It reflected a Justice 
Department effort to keep probative documents from public view—to use the 
court's "sealing" process apparently to hide government wrongdoing.105  
Indeed, Judge Parker's extraordinary apology to Dr. Lee from the bench hinted 
at this.  He intimated that the Justice Department had lied to Dr. Lee and the 
court, that the government might have engaged in racial profiling, and that 
because of the quick plea bargain the public might never know the "real 
reasons why the Executive Branch has done all of this." 
I find it most perplexing, although appropriate, that the Executive Branch today has 
suddenly agreed to your release without any significant conditions or restrictions 
whatsoever on your activities. I note that this has occurred shortly before the Executive 
Branch was to have produced, for my review in camera, a large volume of information 
that I previously ordered it to produce. 
What I believe remains unanswered is the question: What was the government's 
motive in insisting on your being jailed pretrial under extraordinarily onerous 
 
for inaccurate facts and their "alarmist tone").  
 103. Testimony of Dr. Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories, cited at LEE, supra 
note 89, at 231. 
 104. Id. at 233.  This is similar to DeWitt's Final Report statement: "The very fact that no sabotage 
has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken." 
 105. For example, the government provided false evidence and testimony, withheld possibly 
exonerating documents, and held Dr. Lee in solitary confinement under extremely harsh conditions.  
Robert Scheer, The Spy Who Wasn't: Wen Ho Lee," THE NATION, Oct. 2, 2000, at 4; see also Bob 
Drogin, Appeals Court Delays Release of Wen Ho Lee, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at A1 (describing the 
Tenth Circuit's sua sponte stay of Lee's release order, Lee's confinement, and the various charges 
levied against him). 
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conditions of confinement until today, when the Executive Branch agrees that you 
may be set free essentially unrestricted? 106 
Why did the Justice Department pursue this dissonant course?  Prosecutors 
admitted to racial profiling while claiming neutrality and fairness in its actions.  
Simultaneously, government investigators vigorously denied racial profiling.107  
The emerging answer is that the administration sought to benefit politically 
from its new "tough on China" image and that the "noble lie" legitimated 
national security dissembling to the court and public—until Dr. Lee's advocates 
persuaded the court to take a close look at what was actually going on. 
C. Critical Legal Advocacy and Grassroots Organizing 
Judge Parker's decision responded in part to organized advocacy.  Just as 
the government effectively used the media to leak fabricated stories and create 
a public perception of Dr. Lee as foreign spy, Lee's defenders applied counter-
pressure. 
The legal community, through amicus briefs and op-ed pieces, made explicit 
what had only been implied—that Dr. Lee was targeted because of race, not 
because of his actions.  A consortium of Asian American advocacy 
organizations108 filed an amicus curiae brief urging the "Court to rise above the 
racial stereotyping of Asian-Pacific Americans and to continue our judicial 
system's protection of the rights of minorities."109  In the brief, the Asian 
American legal advocates analyzed the government's failure even to follow its 
own (albeit flawed) matrix in targeting Dr. Lee in the "Kindred Spirit" 
investigation.110  The brief further showed that "there is no question that 
similarly situated individuals could have been prosecuted, but were not."111 
 
 106.  Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Lee, No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Sept. 13, 2000) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/14/national/14LTEX.html?ex= 
1106888400&en=ef3b7dd76ad925bf&ei=5070&oref=login (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems).  Judge Parker also expressed being "sad and troubled" by the administration's actions. 
I am also sad and troubled because I do not know the real reasons why the Executive Branch 
has done all of this. We will not learn why because the plea agreement shields the Executive 
Branch from disclosing a lot of information that it was under order to produce that might have 
supplied the answer.  Id. 
 107. Annie Nakao, Wen Ho Lee papers shed light on case; Rights group gets documents unsealed, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 22, 2001, at A9. (Notra Trulock's attorney in the defamation suit he brought against 
Vrooman, Washington, and Lee (which was dismissed), declared that "[h]e [Trulock] didn't racially 
profile anybody."). 
 108. The brief was authored by Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Chinese for 
Affirmative Action, Committee of 100, Japanese American Citizens League, National Asian Pacific 
American Bar Association, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, National Lawyers 
Guild, and Organization of Chinese Americans.  See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Discovery of Materials Related to Selective Prosecution, filed by Asian Law Caucus, U.S. v. 
Wen Ho Lee, No. 99-1417-JC (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 2000), Aug. 8, 2000 available at http://wenholee.org/ 
Amicus.doc (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. Id. at 12.  The amicus brief also pointed out that even the title "Kindred Spirit" indicates the 
government's inappropriate focus on Chinese Americans as the targets of its investigation.  See id. at 
20. 
 111. Id. at 15. 
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Grassroots organizing efforts also reiterated the message that Dr. Lee was a 
victim of racism and government abuse.  Guided in large part by Dr. Lee's 
daughter Alberta,112 Asian American communities, college campuses, and social 
justice groups rallied around his case.113 
Prominent science organizations added pressure with statements protesting 
Dr. Lee's treatment.  Scientists openly criticized the basis of the government's 
charges by showing that most of the material Dr. Lee was accused of 
mishandling was non-classified and readily available in public reports.  They 
also questioned the prosecution of Dr. Lee for actions that were typical of many 
Los Alamos Lab scientists.  The presidents of the National Academy of 
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the National Institute of 
Medicine wrote an open letter to Attorney General Janet Reno, stating that Dr. 
Lee appeared to be "a victim of unjust treatment" that "reflects poorly on the 
U.S. justice system."114  This action marked "the first time that the three 
congressionally chartered academies ever intervened on behalf of an American 
scientist."115 
D. Media Image of Dr. Lee Shifts from "Foreign Spy" to "Victim of 
Government Racial Prosecution" 
These events and counter-messages garnered national press.  Belatedly, the 
mainstream media responded with new images and opinions.  Writers who had 
contributed significantly to the public vilification of Dr. Lee now became 
critical of his treatment and even advocated for his release.116  On August 22 
and 23, 2000—during the crucial days when Judge Parker was considering the 
defense's key motions for bail, discovery, and evidence—editorials and 
 
 112. See LEE supra note 89, at 298-303. Alberta Lee, self-described as formerly apathetic, played a 
crucial role in re-shaping Dr. Lee's public image by passionately defending her father at numerous 
rallies across the country, and by presenting an all-American image that countered the government's 
racist portrayal of the evil and foreign spy.  See James Sterngold, Headstrong Rebel Who Became Her 
Father's Defender, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2000, at A8 (describing Alberta's past and energetic advocacy 
of her father's cause). 
 113. For example, the Coalition Against Racial and Ethnic Scapegoating (CARES) coordinated a 
"National Day of Outrage" on June 8, 2000 in Albuquerque, Detroit, Dallas, Houston, Irvine, 
California, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, and Seattle.  CARES is 
comprised of the Asian Law Caucus, Chinese for Affirmative Action, Organization of Chinese 
Americans, Japanese American Citizens League, and others.  CARES organized the protest action 
with the Association of Asian American Studies, Chinese American Citizens Alliance, Filipino Civil 
Rights Advocates, National Lawyers Guild, National Baptist Convention and others.  Protests also 
took place at the Republican National Convention and Democratic National Convention in June and 
July 2000, respectively. 
 114.  LEE supra note 89, at 307. 
 115. Id.  Dr. Lee's legal team also obtained statements from prominent nuclear physicists Harold 
Agnew and Walter Goad, the latter who wrote: "From the perspective of my experience and expertise, 
these assertions [against Dr. Lee] represent unbridled exaggeration.  The result is not a measured 
judgment of risk, but incitement of apprehension, even paranoia, that can override fairness and 
justice."  Id. at 295.  Statements of support also came from the Federation of American Scientists, 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, and others.  Id. at 296-97. 
 116. From the Editors: The Times and Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A2 (apologizing 
for inaccurate facts and their "alarmist tone"). 
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headlines in major newspapers declared: "Wen Ho Lee Deserves Bail and Fair 
Treatment" (San Francisco Chronicle); "Is Lee Guilty Until Proven Innocent?" 
(Chicago Tribune); "Free Wen Ho Lee" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch); "Wrong 
One Is on Trial in Lee Case" (Los Angeles Times); and "Bail for Wen Ho Lee" 
(New York Times).117 
Organizers also employed an effective strategy of public education through 
print ads in major newspapers.  For example, on August 7, 2000, Chinese for 
Affirmative Action organized a full-page ad in the New York Times demanding 
"Drop all charges.  Free Dr. Wen Ho Lee now."  The ad was titled, "Wen Ho 
Lee & The Nuclear Witch Hunt" and focused on being "charged with being 
ethnic Chinese."  The ad presented Dr. Lee in a different light than New York 
Times readers had become accustomed to seeing.  Instead of the stereotypical 
foreign spy, Dr. Lee was presented as an "American scientist" separated from 
his wife and two children for eight months, countering the usual media image of 
Dr. Lee in shackles. 
Op-ed pieces also countered the executive lies and stereotypes.  Attorneys 
Theodore Wang and Victor Hwang published an opinion piece titled, "Charged 
With Being Ethnic Chinese."118  In it they exposed the racial profiling and 
challenged the premise on which the government based its racist actions.  They 
correctly framed the issue as "not only for Lee but for all Americans concerned 
about whether the government should be able to launch criminal investigations 
based on the race of a suspect."  They also argued that "[b]y focusing only on 
Asian Americans, a real spy may have escaped the scrutiny of the federal 
government altogether."119  This and other op-ed pieces strategically framed the 
issue of racial profiling as one for "all Americans" and publicly questioned the 
effects of allowing the government to continue such practices without 
accountability.120 
Critical legal advocacy and organized pressure helped reframe for the 
public, and for Judge Parker, the real issues—selective racial prosecution 
Executive lies and the need for accountability.  This new sense in the public 
culture of what was really going on and what was really at stake provided the 
backdrop for courtroom decisions.  Amid intensifying demands to free Dr. Lee 
and put the Justice Department on trial instead, Judge Parker ordered the 
government to disclose documents on racial profiling and negotiate a release 
agreement with Dr. Lee.121 
 
 117. For a comprehensive list of over 1,400 press articles from December 20, 1999 through June 9, 
2004 relating to the case of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, see http://www.wenholee.org  (list also on file with 
author). 
 118. Theodore Hsien Wang & Victor Hwang, Charged With Being Ethnic Chinese, PACIFIC NEWS 
SERVICE, Aug. 18, 2000, available at http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/6.16/000818-charged.html 
(on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Wang et al., supra note 100. 
 121. Some have cautioned that Judge Parker's important role in the release of Dr. Lee must be 
balanced with his role in keeping him behind bars for those long months.  Law professor Thomas Joo 
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With the ensuing plea-bargained "settlement," however, the Justice 
Department's documents—and the administration's accountability for apparent 
national security lies—once again lay beyond public reach.122 
V 
"ENEMY COMBATANTS" AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S  
ATTEMPTS TO EVADE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
A. An "Alternative Legal System" 
Shortly after September 11, President Bush's administration shaped the 
broad outlines of an "alternative legal system."123  Described by observers as 
embracing a "shadow Constitution,"124 the system vastly expanded the 
Executive's national security powers.  Most extraordinarily, the system also 
aimed to shield the executive from legal accountability for abuses of those 
broad powers by blocking meaningful judicial review.125 
The administration-sponsored PATRIOT Act, for instance, allows secret 
Justice Department "national security letters" (instead of court-issued 
subpoenas) to force a wide range of private and public institutions to disclose 
confidential information on members of the public.  The Act then bars the 
institutions from ever revealing what they did.126  In September 2004 Federal 
District Judge Marreo declared this part of the Patriot Act unconstitutional 
 
warns, "The judge seemed to imply that he had no choice but to approve the conditions of confinement 
because the government had invoked national security.  He did not question—much less apologize 
for—his own initial failure to scrutinize the government's unsupportable accusations."  Thomas Joo, 
Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After 
September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002).  Also, Judge Parker himself may have been 
responding to the politics of the day.  As a Reagan-appointed conservative judge, his actions can be 
seen as a reaction against the wrongs of the Clinton Justice Department.  Although his statement and 
apology to Dr. Lee was a ringing endorsement of judicial scrutiny and carried the weight of 
exoneration, more analysis is needed concerning the role of partisan politics in those actions. 
 122. For further efforts by Dr. Lee's supporters to use the courts and media to hold the government 
accountable, see  Section VI, infra. 
 123. Unsigned Editorial, The Limits of Trust (Cont'd), THE WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at A14; see 
also Unsigned Editorial, Chipping Away at Liberty, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2002, at A24 
(describing the "alternative legal system" as "a system that lets Americans be investigated and locked 
up without any of the normal protections of the justice system"). 
 124. Nat Hentoff, Our Designated Killers—Where is the Outrage?, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 14, 
2003 ("The disciplined Bush administration strives continually to keep out of the news those of its 
security operations that are creating what The Washington Post accurately and ominously describes as 
an 'alternative legal system.'  Or, as I call it, 'a shadow Constitution.'"), available at 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0308, hentoff,41940,6.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems) 
 125. Balkin, supra note 74; see also Harvey A. Silverglate & Carl Takei, Crossing the Threshold, 
THE BOSTON PHOENIX, Mar. 5-11, 2004  (describing the executive's usurpation of power under the 
USA PATRIOT Act and the assertion that the administration possessed unilateral authority "to 
choose between a regular trial and a military tribunal; to lock up a suspect, if a non-citizen, in secret; or 
to hold a suspect—citizen or non-citizen—indefinitely and without judicial review after designating him 
an 'enemy combatant'"). 
 126. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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because it "effectively bars or substantially deters any judicial challenge to the 
propriety of an NSL request.  In the Court's view, ready availability of judicial 
process to pursue such a challenge is necessary to vindicate important rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution or by statute."127 
1. Designating and Detaining "Enemy Combatants" While Avoiding 
Judicial Scrutiny 
From the outset of the U.S. attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Bush 
administration asserted that "the capture and detention of enemy combatants is 
an inherent part of waging war, and the President's decision whether to detain a 
person as an enemy combatant is a basic exercise of his discretion to determine 
the level of force needed to prosecute the conflict."128 
Simply put, the administration declared that it had the power to unilaterally 
designate citizens and non-citizens "enemy combatants,"129 and that a person so 
designated would not be criminally charged or tried, would have no access to 
family, would have no access to counsel, could be held in solitary confinement 
indefinitely, and, most important, would lack any right to contest whether the 
designation was proper in the first place.130  The administration further 
maintained that "the best interests of the Nation in wartime" shielded the 
President's designation and detention of enemy combatants from searching 
judicial inquiry because "judges have little or no background in the delicate 
business of intelligence gathering."131 
2. Guantanamo Bay (Rasul v. Bush) 
In 2001 the administration announced that "enemy combatants" captured in 
Afghanistan and incarcerated in the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba did 
not have the rights of prisoners of war and indeed had no right to challenge 
 
 127. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 128. Reply Brief of Petitioner at *13, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 
WL 871163. ("[T]he courts may set aside the President's actions as exceeding the authority conferred 
by Congress only in exceptional circumstances."); see also Kathleen Clark and Julie Mertus, Torturing 
the Law; The Justice Department's Legal Contortions on Interrogation, THE WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, 
at B03 (quoting Memorandum of Office of Legal Counsel's Alberto R. Gonzales to the President, Aug. 
1, 2002, "The president enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his commander in chief 
authority. . . . Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy 
combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield."). 
 129. Lori Baker contributed substantially to the research and writing on the enemy combatant 
cases. 
 130. Cruz, supra note 32, at 134; see also Oral Argument before USSCT, at 29, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)). (No. 03-6696) (explaining that government was allowing Hamdi limited access 
to counsel, not as a matter of right but because military intelligence experts determined that counsel 
would no longer interfere with intelligence gathering).  But see Nat Hentoff, Is Bush the Law?, THE 
VILLIAGE VOICE, May 7, 2004, at 5 (suggesting that the Justice Department really allowed Hamdi 
limited access to counsel only to try to soften some justice's opposition to the government's hardline 
position), available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0419,hentoff,53338,6.html (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 
2004 WL 113598 (internal citations omitted). 
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their indefinite detentions in the federal courts.132  The administration argued 
that because Guantanamo Bay is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, no U.S. court could hear their challenges.  The detainees could 
only challenge their enemy combatant designation if and when the President 
chose to allow them a limited hearing before a military tribunal.133  The 
President declined to hold military tribunal hearings until belatedly compelled 
to do so by the Supreme Court.  Even those hearings offered very limited due 
process protections.134  Vice President Cheney explained that those detainees 
"don't deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an 
American citizen going through the normal judicial process."135 
3. Lindh, Hamdi, and Padilla 
Cheney's statement implied that the administration intended to recognize 
that U.S. citizens possessed due process "guarantees and safeguards."  But 
subsequent administration actions revealed that only certain citizen enemy 
combatants would be afforded legal protections. 
White American John Walker Lindh, from a middle class California family, 
tightly fit the government's enemy combatant description—"an individual who 
surrenders with enemy forces in an active theater of combat while armed with a 
military assault weapon is an archetypal enemy combatant."136  The President, 
however, declined to designate Lindh an enemy combatant.  After his transfer 
to the United States from an Afghan battlefield, the government immediately 
lodged criminal charges against Lindh in open court.  Lindh received full access 
to a first-class lawyer and to family members.  Because he admitted fighting for 
the Taliban against the U.S., his lawyer plea-bargained a lengthy prison term in 
exchange for elimination of the death penalty.137 
By contrast, the government denied Yaser Hamdi all legal protections.  A 
U.S. citizen born in Louisiana, of Saudi Arabian family heritage, he, like Lindh, 
was taken into custody in Afghanistan in 2001.  Unlike Lindh, Hamdi 
maintained that he was not fighting for the Taliban or Al Qaeda and that he 
 
 132. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 13, 2001) (presidential documents at 57831-
57836). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Jess Bravin, U.S. to Unveil Review System for Guantanamo Detainees, WALL ST. J., June 21, 
2004, at B1.  According to Bravin, "The review boards could consider . . . hearsay, rumors and 
comments from intelligence agencies and foreign governments; the prisoner won't be told about 
classified evidence or offered the chance to rebut it.  Officers assigned to help prisoners prepare for 
their hearings would be required to tell superiors anything incriminating prisoners might say."  Id.  The 
officers and those assigned to advise the board for the secret proceedings cannot be lawyers or 
chaplains. 
 135. Peter Slevin and George Lardner Jr., Bush Plan for Terrorism Trials Defended—Military 
Tribunals Appropriate in War, Ashcroft says; Critics Cite Constitution, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, 
at A28. 
 136. Brief of Respondents in Opposition at 19, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-
6696), 2003 WL 23189498 (emphasis added). 
 137. Koh, supra note 80, at 9. 
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was in Afghanistan to do humanitarian relief work.  Yet, after three years, the 
government still declined to bring charges or allow him to establish innocence.  
Instead, it held him indefinitely in solitary confinement as an enemy combatant 
in a military brig with no family contact and no access to a lawyer (until 
litigation belatedly procured limited legal access).138 
The administration designated Jose Padilla, a Puerto Rican American, an 
enemy combatant even though he did not fit the "archetypal enemy combatant" 
description.  The government initially detained Padilla at the Chicago Airport 
pursuant to a material witness warrant.  He possessed no weapons and was 
clearly outside any zone of combat.  Padilla, a former gang member with a 
murder conviction, had met with Al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan.  One 
month after his arrest in the U.S., and two days before a federal district court 
was expected to rule on the lawfulness of his material witness detention, the 
President designated Padilla an enemy combatant.139 
The Attorney General and other administration officials vilified Hamdi and 
Padilla as terrorists acting to destroy America.  As detailed below, those 
statements, made to justify their indefinite detention without charges or trial, 
appear to have been knowing misrepresentations. 
The administration's refusal to explain its enemy combatant designation 
process generally, its apparent public dissembling about the threat posed by 
detainees, and its differential treatment of white and non-white citizens 
together raised the red flag of potential Executive abuse of power.  Perhaps for 
this very reason, the administration staunchly resisted close judicial review of its 
actions.  Initially, the administration advocated for no judicial review at all, 
arguing that the "courts may not second-guess the military's determination that 
an individual is an enemy combatant."140  But in light of lower federal courts' 
reluctance to acquiesce entirely to the executive,141 the administration softened 
its stance and conceded that its determination could be subject to minimal (or 
less than minimal) judicial review.  More particularly, the administration 
maintained in Hamdi's and Padilla's cases that a bare hearsay-laden declaration 
(the "Mobbs Declaration") by an unknown official without personal knowledge 
of the particulars, setting forth conclusory statements about their capture, 
should be sufficient to defeat a detainee's habeas corpus challenge.142 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39, 40 (2003/2004). 
 140. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The government thus submits that we 
may not review at all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant—that its 
determinations on this score are the first and final word."). 
 141. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va 2002); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 142. See Brief of Respondants at 29, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 
WL 724020; Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Newman, supra note 137, at 
43  According to Newman, Padilla's counsel, Michael H. Mobbs, the Defense Department employee 
who signed the declarations, had no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding Padilla's capture and 
detention, but rather relied on "two anonymous and uncorroborated intelligence sources."  One of 
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4. Exaggerations, Distortions, and Lies to Justify the Detention of "Enemy 
Combatants" 
The administration's argument for no—or at most attenuated—judicial 
scrutiny thus amounted to "the government is on a war footing[;] . . . you have 
to trust the executive."143  As described generally in the first three sections and 
developed here, however, the Bush administration's dissembling on national 
security belied that trust. 
For example, the administration publicly celebrated detaining over six 
hundred "enemy combatants" in Guantanamo Bay because "locked within the 
steel-mesh cells of the military prison . . .  are some of the most dangerous 
terrorists on Earth."144  The administration knew early on, however, that none 
of the detainees ranked "as leaders or senior operatives of al-Qaida" and "only 
a relative handful . . . [were] sworn al-Qaida members or other high-value 
militants able to elucidate the organization's inner workings."145  The 
administration later conceded that many of the detainees, who were barred 
from demonstrating their innocence, were never dangerous—some were young 
teenagers and others were taken by mistake or by unscrupulous bounty 
hunters.146 
Exaggerations and factual distortions also influenced the administrations' 
portrayal of Padilla, the "dirty-bomber."  In announcing Padilla's arrest, 
Attorney General Ashcroft announced that the government had "disrupted an 
unfolding terrorist plot" to attack the United States with a radioactive "dirty 
bomb."147  Shortly thereafter, Deputy Security of Defense Wolfowitz explained 
 
these sources subsequently recanted and the other "has a history of intentionally providing false 
information to investigators in order to mislead them."  Id. 
 143. Oral Argument before USSCT, at *19, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-
1027), 2004 WL 1066129 (emphasis added) (Deputy Solicitor General Paul D. Clement's responding to 
whether there is "any judicial check" on the executive.); see also Paul Krugman, Just Trust Us, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at ABS 23 ("No administration since Nixon has been so insistent that it has the 
right to operate without oversight or accountability, and no administration since Nixon has shown itself 
to be so little deserving of that trust."). 
 144. Detainee Value in Question, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, June 21, 2004, at A8. 
 145. Id. at A8 (describing a September 2002 top-secret CIA study that revealed many of the 
detainees to be only low-level recruits.) 
 146. Two Years After 9/11, Guantanamo Prisoners Remain in Legal Limbo, ABCNEWS.com, June 
25, 2004 (quoting Defense Department employee Mark Jacobsen, "Some people were simply in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. . . . A lot of them were the flotsam and jetsam of the battlefield.").  
John Mintz, U.S. Releases 3 Teens from Guantanamo, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at A01  
(describing the tension between human rights groups' contention that imprisoning children is 
"inhumane" and the Defense Department's insistence that "age is not a determining factor in 





n=Search - I#I 
 147. Associated Press, Atty. Gen. Ashcroft's Announcement, June 10, 2002, 2002 WL 22578099 
(emphasis added). 
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that there was "no actual plan" and no "unfolding terrorist plot."  At most, a 
plot was "still in the initial planning stages."148 
Several months later, the administration submitted the Mobbs Declaration 
to justify Padilla's continued indefinite detention as an enemy combatant.  The 
declaration stated that Padilla had discussed plans with a senior lieutenant for 
Al-Qaeda "to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device (also known as 
a 'dirty bomb') within the United States"149 and indicated that the plans were 
on-going.  Declassified Pentagon papers, however, indicated that the 
administration overstated if not misrepresented its case.150  A Pentagon report 
suggested that top Al-Qaeda officials were never on board with Padilla's dirty-
bomb plot.151  In the report's footnotes were Padilla's statements to 
interrogators that he never swore allegiance to Al-Qaeda and that he had 
doubts about his involvement with the organization.152  The administration 
failed to submit this relevant, potentially exculpatory, information to the courts.  
Instead it constructed an at least partially false picture of Padilla's threat to 
national security and then argued that the courts should "trust the executive." 
Recently, additional signs of administrative dissembling emerged after two 
years of fierce litigation in Hamdi's case.  From the start, the Bush 
administration publicly justified its indefinite and unchallengeable detention of 
Hamdi by saying that he posed an ongoing terrorist threat—releasing Hamdi 
would allow him to "rejoin the enemy and renew [his] belligerency against" 
American forces.153  The government's recent handling of Hamdi's case, 
however, suggests that Hamdi may never have been a significant threat.  After 
three years of his incommunicado imprisonment, the administration decided to 
free Hamdi in another country rather than to continue his detention under the 
limited due process parameters set out by the Supreme Court's June 2004 
Hamdi decision.154  This turnaround—releasing a supposedly dangerous anti-
 
 148. Paul Wolfowitz, Justice Department Briefing, June 10, 2002, 2002 WL 1272427 (emphasis 
added). 
 149. Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy (Aug. 27, 2002),  at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/tools/ 
mobbspadilla.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems) 
 150. See Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Remarks of Deputy Attorney General James 
Comey Regarding Jose Padilla, (June 1, 2004) (presenting recently declassified information about 
Padilla that shows the government overstated its case), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
speech/2004/dag6104.htm (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 151. Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, Facing Defeat?, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 2004, available at 
2004 WL 72544158. 
 152. Nat Hentoff, DOJ and Padilla; A "Hail Mary" pass to the Supreme Court, THE WASH. TIMES, 
June 14, 2004, at A19. 
 153. See Brief of Respondants at *20-21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 
2004 WL 724020 (arguing that because "American troops are still engaged in active combat against al 
Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan[,] . . . [t]he President's authority to use military force . . . must 
include the authority to detain those enemy combatants who are captured during the conflict; 
otherwise, such combatants could rejoin the enemy and renew their belligerency against our forces"). 
 154. See Andrew Cohen, Crying Wolf in the War Against Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at B11 
("Nothing the Supreme Court declared in the Hamdi case . . . requires the government to take the 
action it took."). 
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American Al-Qaeda terrorist or Taliban fighter—triggered deep suspicion that 
the administration was dissembling all along in an attempt to justify its 
unilateral and indefinite detention of all persons it designates as enemy 
combatants—regardless of their danger.  As one commentator aptly observed, 
"If Hamdi is such a minor threat today that he can go back to the Middle East 
without a trial or any other proceeding, it's hard not to wonder whether the 
government has been crying wolf all these years."155 
B. Critical Legal Advocacy and Public Pressure 
1. Legislative Undersight 
With mounting evidence of White House abuses of its national security 
powers, hundreds of cities and several states passed resolutions rejecting the 
administration's disregard for civil liberties.156  Congressional Republicans and 
Democrats also submitted bills to roll back the overreaching sections of the 
PATRIOT Act.157  Yet, despite recent signs of legislative resistance, Congress 
has done little to rein in the Executive's expansive national security powers.158  
With an ineffectual Congress and an administration claiming near absolute 
authority in matters of national security, executive accountability has devolved 
to the third branch of government—the courts—and an informed public. 
2. Critical Legal Advocacy 
Contrary to conventional teachings, courts "are responsive in varying ways 
to political will" and will exercise vigilance in protecting constitutional 
guarantees in controversial cases, "but only when pushed to do so by the 
coordinated efforts of frontline community and political organizations, scholars, 
journalists and politicians."159  Critical legal advocacy is one integral element of 
that push.  In addition to traditional legal arguments based narrowly on past 
case texts, critical legal advocacy aims to reveal what is really at stake, who 
benefits and who is harmed (in the short and long terms), who wields the 
behind-the-scenes power, which social values are supported and which are 
subverted, how political concerns are framing the legal questions, and how 
societal institutions and differing segments of the populace will be affected by 
the court's decision.160 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, at http://www.bordc.org. (website documenting state 
and city resolutions protecting civil liberties challenged by the PATRIOT Act). 
 157. Nat Hentoff, Declarations of Independence, THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 14, 2004, available at 
http://villagevoice.com/news/0424,hentoff,54304,6.html (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 158. Benjamin Wittes, Enemy Americans, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2004, at 135 
(describing the lack of attention to a bill introduced by Democratic congressman Adam Schiff that 
would require the Pentagon to formulate rules for citizen enemy combatants). 
 159. Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27 AMERASIA J. 51, 60 
(2001). 
 160. For scholarship by critical legal scholars, particularly critical race theorists, examining these 
aspects of the administration's war on terror, see Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil 
Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. 
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An array of powerful amicus briefs reflected this kind of legal advocacy.  In 
the Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul detention cases, retired federal judges, 
government officials, legal experts, and civil, social, and political organizations 
challenged the Bush administration's attack on fundamental civil liberties.  
From across the political spectrum these groups filed briefs urging the courts to 
hold the administration accountable for national security abuses.  A common 
theme emanated from this effort: The Bush administration transgressed the 
principles of the separation of powers and must be held in check by the courts. 
In one unlikely alliance, the libertarian Cato Institute, the conservative 
Rutherford Institute, and the liberal People for the American Way joined in an 
amicus brief in the Second Circuit Padilla case "to support the traditional 
understanding of the separation of powers between the Legislature and 
Executive Branches."161  They also argued that Congress's Authorization for 
Use of Military Force Act did not authorize the executive to detain American 
citizens on American soil. 
Heavy pressure on the courts also came from a group of former federal 
judges and attorneys who shared "an abiding interest in the independence of 
the judiciary as a check on the actions of the Executive Branch."162  This group 
submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in Hamdi and Padilla that 
criticized the Second and Fourth Circuits for abdicating this crucial judicial 
responsibility.  Specifically, the amici asserted that the Fourth Circuit violated 
the separation of powers doctrine when it immunized "executive actions from 
judicial scrutiny"163 by affording "conclusive effect to the two-page hearsay 
Mobbs Declaration.164 
 
ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. 295 (2002); Saito, supra note 9; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 
UCLA L. Rev. 1575 (2002); Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195 
(2002); Cruz, supra note 32, at 139; see  YAMAMOTO ET. AL., supra note 11. 
 161. Consented-to brief of Amici Curiae the Cato Institute, the Center for National Security 
Studies, The Constitution Project, The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, People for the 
American Way and The Rutherford Institute in Support of Petitioner-Appellee Jose Padilla and Partial 
Affirmance and Partial Reversal at ix, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/padilla_no_authority.pdf (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems).  See Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001(a) ("No citizen shall be 
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."). 
 162. Brief of Amici Curiae Hon Shirley M. Hufstedler, Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, Hon. William A. 
Norris, Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, Hon. Herbert J. Stern, Hon. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., R. Scott Greathead, 
Robert M. Pennoyer, Barbara Paul Robinson, and William D. Zabel in Support of Respondents at *2, 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 792210.  "The government's 
position reflects not so much a compelling security interest in detaining "enemy combatants" as it does 
a desire to detain anyone whom it says is an enemy combatant without permitting any inquiry into 
whether the allegation is true.  It is a claim reminiscent of the now-discredited World War II decisions 
that led to thousands of loyal American citizens being deprived of their liberty without opportunity to 
contest the assumptions that underlay their detention."  Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
 163.  Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Hon. William A. 
Norris, Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, Hon. Herbert J. Stern, Hon. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Scott Greathead, 
Robert M. Pennoyer, and Barbara Paul Robinson in Support of Petitioners at *8-10, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) 2004 WL 371007 (criticizing the Second Circuit's use of 
the "some evidence" standard, which "would undermine the unique role of the federal courts and the 
writ of habeas corpus as the ultimate legal protection against Executive overreaching," id. at *28). 
 164. Id. at 4. 
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Even more unlikely support came from the military's own lawyers, the 
Judge Advocate General's Corps, who criticized the government for politically 
tainted prosecutions and violations of international law.  In seeming defiance of 
an administration that has proclaimed that "you are either with us or you are 
against us,"165 five JAG attorneys assigned to defend Guantanamo detainees 
before the administration's proposed military tribunals filed an amicus brief 
with the Court.166  The JAG lawyers characterized "the tribunals as inherently 
unfair, contrary to international law and susceptible to political influence."167 
In another extraordinary move, members of the British Parliament echoed 
this view in their amicus brief to the Supreme Court.  The brief, in support of 
the Guantanamo detainees, recounted the shared historical commitment of the 
United States and the United Kingdom to a "tripartite separation of powers 
and a truly independent judiciary."168  The brief warned that judicial 
acquiescence to the administration's claim of absolute power over the detainees 
would legitimate the existence of "a prison for indefinite detention functioning 
in total secret, under the unchallenged exclusive control of the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. government."169 
Most poignantly, an amicus brief filed by Fred Korematsu reminded the 
Court that "the Government's position is part of a pattern whereby the 
Executive Branch curtails civil liberties much more than necessary during 
wartime and seeks to insulate the basis for its actions from any judicial 
scrutiny."170  The brief recounted six instances in U.S. history in which the 
Executive reacted "too harshly in circumstances of felt necessity and 
underestimate[ed] the damage to civil liberties," only to have its actions 
legitimated by courts employing an uncritical standard of judicial review.171  
Fred Korematsu challenged the Court to learn from the lessons of history and 
"to protect constitutional liberties when they matter most, rather than 
belatedly, years after the fact."172 
 
 165. Remarks Following Discussions With President Jacques Chirac of France and an Exchange 
With Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1352 (Nov. 6, 2001). 
 166. Military Commissions as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 96765. 
 167. Id. at 2. 
 168.  Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *16, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 96766. 
 169. Id. at 21; see also Brief of Janet Reno, et al., Amici Curiae in Support Respondents, Rumsfeld 
v. Newman, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 782374 (describing the government's broad 
existing powers to gather intelligence, apprehend terrorists, and secure classified information before 
calling upon the Court to carefully scrutinize the executive's actions). 
 170.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in support of Petitioners at *2, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. 
Ct. 2686 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 103832 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. at *4 (describing six examples to "illustrate the nature and magnitude of the challenge: the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the prosecution 
of dissenters during World War I, the Red Scare of 1919-1920, the internment of 120,000 individuals of 
Japanese descent during World War II, and the era of loyalty oaths and McCarthyism during the Cold 
War.") 
 172. Id. at *4. 
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3. Public Pressure 
The amicus briefs, along with the writings of critical race scholars, sought 
directly to influence the courts and the reporting media.  Legal and social 
commentators also sought indirectly to influence the courts by exposing to the 
public the threats to civil liberties posed by the Bush administration's national 
security policies.  These commentators, providing intellectual grist for 
community group protests and street marches,173 employed a variety of media to 
voice their concerns about administration excesses and its penchant for 
dissembling about national security, including op-ed essays, articles, books, and 
internet messages.174 
For instance, three books by authors from varying political perspectives 
"share a chilling view of the Bush administration's war on civil liberties."175  
According to reviewer Michael Stern, Nat Hentoff176 is a "staunch lefty," Philip 
Heymann177 a centrist and James Bovard178 a libertarian.179  Despite 
philosophical differences, their "sobering conclusions about the impact of the 
'war on terror' on U.S. democracy have three core elements in common."180  
First, all three worry that the administration's realignment of power in the 
Executive Branch has significantly weakened America's system of checks and 
balances.  Second, each author expresses deep skepticism about the 
administration's "declaration of a permanent state of emergency."181  Last, all 
three object to the administration's persistent efforts to undermine fundamental 
"democratic values and traditions."182 
 
 173. See, e.g., Lynette Clemetson, Threats and Responses: Rally; Thousands Converge in Capital to 
Protest Plans for War, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at A12. 
 174. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Patriot II: The Sequel Why It's Even Scarier Than the First Patriot 
Act, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Feb. 17, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20030217.html (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems); Anita Ramasastry, Do Hamdi and Padilla Need Company: Why 
Attorney General Ashcroft's Plan To Create Internment Camps For Supposed Citizen Combatants Is 
Shocking And Wrong, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Aug. 21, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
ramasastry/20020821.html (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems); John Dean, Missing Weapons 
Of Mass Destruction: Is Lying About The Reason For War An Impeachable Offense?, FINDLAW'S 
WRIT, Jun. 06, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/ 20030606.html (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 175. Michael Stern, Attacked from All Sides, 2/2004 Am. Law. 59 (2004). 
 176. NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE GATHERING RESISTANCE 
(Seven Stories Press 2003). 
 177. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 
(MIT Press 2003). 
 178. JAMES BOVARD, TERRORISM AND TYRANNY: TRAMPLING FREEDOM, JUSTICE, AND PEACE 
TO RID THE WORLD OF EVIL (Palgrave Macmillan 2003). 
 179. Stern, supra note 175. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (Heymann concludes that the Administration has "carefully exploited the right to use 
selective enforcement of rarely used statutes and powers to act against a group or activity for purposes 
largely unconnected with the purposes of the Congress in passing the statute"). 
 182. Id.; see also Robert A. Levy, Citizen Padilla: Dangerous Precedents, National Review Online, 
June 6, 2002 available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levy062402.asp (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems) (as a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute, warning that 
legitimating the excesses of the Bush administration will, in effect, empower future and perhaps less 
well-intentioned administrations with the same overreaching authority). 
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Perhaps most compelling, John Dean, Republican and former White House 
counsel, whose truthful testimony broke open the Nixon White House's 
Watergate cover-up, authored a series of biting critiques.  In particular, two of 
his influential essays revealed the depth and breadth of Bush White House 
dissembling in justifying the war against Iraq and in outing CIA undercover 
operative Valarie Plame in retaliation for her spouse's criticism of the 
President's "Iraq nuclear threat" misrepresentation in his 2003 State of the 
Union address.183  Dean characterized the Bush administration's exaggerations 
and fabrications as exceeding those of the paranoid Nixon administration—all 
of whose top officials were imprisoned for their Watergate lies.  Dean also 
characterized the Bush administration's dissembling and retaliation on matters 
of grave national importance "an impeachable offense"—especially when 
compared to the "sex lies" grounds for the Republican impeachment of then-
President Clinton.184 
C. The Politics of Judicial Scrutiny of Executive National Security Actions 
1.  Lower Courts and the Political Underpinnings of Judicial Decisionmaking 
In the face of wide-ranging challenges to the Bush administration's national 
security actions, the federal judiciary responded erratically.  Most reviewing 
courts expressed deep skepticism of the administration's early argument 
advocating for no judicial review at all. These lower federal courts, however, 
disagreed about the appropriate level—or intensity—of judicial scrutiny and 
therefore how active the courts should be in holding the administration 
accountable for its apparent national security abuses. 
Federal district court Judge Doumar, a Reagan appointee, articulated a 
heightened standard of judicial review for enemy combatant cases.  As the trial 
judge in Hamdi, Doumar announced that at a minimum meaningful judicial 
review must "determine if the government's classification was determined 
pursuant to appropriate authority, the screening criteria used to make and 
maintain that classification is consistent with due process, and the basis of the 
continued detention serves national security."185  Doumar concluded that the 
Mobbs Declaration was insufficient to justify Hamdi's enemy combatant 
designation and ongoing detention.  In particular, the declaration failed "to 
address the nature and authority of Mr. Mobbs to review and to make 
declarations on behalf of the Executive regarding Hamdi's classification,"186 and 
 
 183. DEAN, supra note 85; John W. Dean, Why A Special Prosecutor's Investigation Is Needed To 
Sort Out the Niger Uranium And Related WMDs Mess, FINDLAW'S WRIT, July 18, 2003, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030718.html (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems); 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030718.html; John W. Dean, The Bush Administration Adopts a 
Worse-than-Nixonian Tactic: The Deadly Serious Crime Of Naming CIA Operatives, FINDLAW'S WRIT, 
Aug. 15, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20030815.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems) . 
 184. Dean, supra note 174. 
 185. Cruz, supra note 32, at 139 (quoting Judge Doumar's analysis). 
 186. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
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omitted "the screening criteria actually used by the government in its 
classification decision."187  Rejecting the deferential judicial role advocated by 
the administration, Judge Doumar concluded: 
The Mobbs Declaration is little more than the government's "say-so" regarding the 
validity of Hamdi's classification. . . . If the Court were to accept the Mobbs 
Declaration as sufficient justification for detaining Hamdi in the present 
circumstances, then it would be abdicating any semblance of the most minimal level of 
judicial review.  If effect, this Court would be acting as little more than a rubber-
stamp. 188 
Judge Doumar's approach to heightened scrutiny of the administration's 
national security claim offers insight into the feasibility and importance of the 
"four key process tasks" in the "Strategic Blueprint"189 for "watchful judicial 
care"—in particular, the judge's critical examination of what was at stake 
politically and socially in the controversy beyond the narrow legal claims, his 
careful assessment of the role of the executive during national crisis and the 
corresponding role of the courts in actually reviewing and not "rubber-
stamping" executive actions that appeared to curtail liberties of Americans, and 
his call for governmental production of bona fide evidence of danger posed by 
those targeted for indefinite government incarceration. 
By contrast, other courts' enemy combatant decisions more closely tracked 
the administration's "no meaningful review" posture.  For example, in Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, District Judge Mukasey, another Reagan appointee, granted Padilla 
the right to present facts through counsel to challenge his enemy combatant 
designation.190  But, Judge Mukasey then sharply limited Padilla's ability to 
advocate. Based on the All Writs Act, rather than on the Constitution, 
Mukasey's ruling "excluded Padilla from using counsel to conduct discovery, 
cross-examine witnesses, and meaningfully rebut the executive's testimony."  
Equally important, Mukasey adopted the highly deferential "some evidence 
standard" of judicial review advanced by the administration.  That standard, 
which observers characterize as "masquerading" for meaningful review, 191 
directs the court effectively to ignore facts presented by the detainee and to 
focus entirely on the government's evidence (for example, the entirely hearsay-
based Mobb's Declaration) to determine simply "whether "there is some 
evidence of Padilla's hostile status" and "whether that evidence has not been 
entirely mooted by subsequent events."192 
The politically conservative Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals193 in Hamdi 
embraced a similar hands-off approach and chastised Judge Doumar for 
 
 187. Id. at 534. 
 188. Id. at 535. 
 189. See Section II, supra. 
 190. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 191. Cruz, supra note 32, at 146-47. 
 192. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
 193. See Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 40 (noting that 
there are twice as many Republicans than Democrats in the Fourth Circuit and that the court has been 
characterized as "not only conservative but also bold and muscular in its conservatism") 
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requiring the Bush administration to substantiate the hearsay-based statements 
in the Mobbs Declaration.  To do so, the court observed, "would be to wade 
further into the conduct of war than we consider appropriate and is unnecessary 
to a meaningful judicial review."194  And although "the privilege of citizenship" 
entitled Hamdi to judicial review, no factual inquiry was needed in the case 
because "it [was] undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active 
combat operations in a foreign country and because any inquiry must be 
circumscribed to avoid encroachment into the military affairs entrusted to the 
Executive Branch."195  Notably, the Fourth Circuit's Judge Motz, in dissent, 
rejected the majority's determination that hearsay could justify an enemy 
combatant designation and criticized the court for merely rubberstamping "the 
Executive's unsupported designation."196 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals also vindicated the 
administration's enemy combatant policy.  Embracing the administration's 
stance in its entirety in Al Odah v. United States, the court held that the 
detainees could not seek redress in the courts because Guantanamo Bay falls 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.197  "They cannot seek 
release based on violations of the Constitution or treaties or federal law" 
because "the courts are not open to them."198 
In late 2003 the tide changed for the Bush administration when two separate 
appellate courts, often characterized as liberal-leaning, rebuked the 
administration's attempts to evade judicial scrutiny.  In Gherebi v. Bush, the 
Ninth Circuit's "outspoken liberal," Judge Stephen Reinhardt, observed that 
"[e]ven in times of national emergency . . . it is the obligation of the Judicial 
Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitutional values and to prevent 
the Executive Branch from running roughshod over the rights of citizens and 
aliens alike."199  In stark contrast with the D.C. Circuit's earlier ruling, the Ninth 
Circuit held that federal courts have jurisdiction over the U.S. naval base in 
Guantanamo Bay.200 
The next rebuke came when the Second Circuit held that President Bush 
had neither inherent constitutional authority nor the Congressional 
authorization required by the Non-Detention Act of 1971 to detain American 
Padilla on American soil outside a zone of combat.201  Rejecting the 
administration's assertion that the judiciary should refrain from second-
guessing military decisions, the court emphasized that "separation of powers 
are heightened when the Commander-in-Chief's powers are exercised in the 
 
 194. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 195. Id. at 473. 
 196. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 373 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting). 
 197. Al Odah, v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 198. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). 
 199. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the helpfulness of the 
twelve amicus briefs submitted in support of Padilla and one in support of the administration). 
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domestic sphere."202 Although it conceded that "grave national emergencies" 
may necessitate the curtailment of citizens' liberties, the court reminded the 
administration that Congress must act in concert with the President to do so.203  
Drawing from amici, the court affirmed the "fundamental role for the courts" in 
carefully scrutinizing executive actions "where the exercise of Commander-in-
Chief powers . . . is challenged on the ground that it collides with the powers 
assigned by the Constitution to Congress."204 
2. Supreme Court Declares Commitment to "Meaningful Review" and Then 
Backs Down 
The lower courts' dissension focused public scrutiny and political organizing 
on the Supreme Court, including the plethora of amicus briefs calling on the 
Court to scrutinize the administration's unprecedented enemy combatant 
policy.  Also, legal, social, and political commentators critical of the 
administration's curtailment of civil liberties intensified their efforts to educate 
the public in journals, op-ed pieces, and newspaper editorials; several of the 
lower courts' "conservative" decisions gave critics a reason to redouble their 
efforts.  In response, administration backers mounted a fierce public education 
campaign directed at the Court's conservative majority to support the 
administration's actions and its position on "no judicial review." 
3. Padilla 
In June 2004, the Court sidestepped Padilla's constitutional claims, which 
had been viewed as "the most compelling challenge to the Bush 
administration's aggressive tactics."205  The Court avoided ruling on the merits 
by finding Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld an improper respondent and the 
Southern District of New York the wrong jurisdiction.206 
4. Hamdi 
The Court's Hamdi decision reflected colliding political currents.  At the 
outset of the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor highlighted the importance of 
Hamdi's "meaningful opportunity to challenge the facts." 
[A]lthough Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow 
circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United 
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual 
basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker.207 
 
 202. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 714. 
 204. Id. at 713 (clarifying its determination by stating that "when the executive acts, even in the 
conduct of war, in the face of apparent congressional disapproval, challenges to his authority must be 
examined and resolved by the Article III courts"). 
 205. John Riley, Why Did the Court Duck "Enemy Combatant" Padilla's Case?, SEATTLE TIMES, 
July 6, 2004, at A3. 
 206. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
 207. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2634 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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Consistent with this declaration, O'Connor expressed the Court's commitment 
to resolving the dispute only after "a careful examination both of the writ of 
habeas corpus . . . and of the Due Process Clause."208  After careful examination 
the majority rejected the administration's argument that the circumstances of 
Hamdi's capture were "undisputed." 
The majority next considered the President's argument in favor of the 
highly deferential "some evidence" standard.209  The majority first expressed its 
agreement with numerous amici who asserted that "the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of a citizen's liberty in the absence of sufficient process here is very 
real."  The Court acknowledged the lessons of "history and common sense," 
namely "that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become 
a means for oppression and abuse."210  Most significantly, the majority opinion 
indicated that the Court, unlike the Fourth Circuit, would not embrace the 
administration's claims of unfettered authority. 
It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's 
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we 
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.211 
In the end, however, and in stark contrast to the tone of most of O'Connor's 
opinion, the Court backed down.  Although acknowledging Hamdi's right to 
challenge the "facts" in the Mobbs Declaration, the majority then announced 
that "enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military 
conflict."212  Sharply undermining the majority's express commitment to 
"meaningful review," Justice O'Connor offered a glimpse of what the 
"tailored" procedure for enemy combatants might look like: acceptance of 
unreliable hearsay and a presumption in favor of the government's evidence. 
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence 
from the Government in such a proceeding.  Likewise, the Constitution would not be 
offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that 
presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were 
provided.  Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas 
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner 
to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the 
criteria.213 
O'Connor also opened the door for "appropriately authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal(s)" to serve as the "neutral decision-maker"214—
notwithstanding the protestation of the detainees' military lawyers that those 
 
 208. Id. at  2644. 
 209. See id. at 2645 (concluding that "[u]nder this review, a court would assume the accuracy of the 
Government's articulated basis for Hamdi's detention, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, and 
assess only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one"). 
 210. Id. at 2647. 
 211. Id. at 2648. 
 212. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2649. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 2651. 
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tribunals would be inherently unfair and politically-influenced.  In effect, 
despite its earlier rhetoric about careful scrutiny, the Court's opinion appeared 
to set the stage for largely deferential review. 
5. Rasul 
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court rejected the administration's "no judicial review 
at all" position—"federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of 
the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be 
wholly innocent of wrongdoing."215  The Court thus affirmed the importance of 
judicial scrutiny of alleged executive abuse of national security powers.  The 
Court left unstated, however, the judicial standards for reviewing 
administration actions.  That silence spoke volumes—at least to the 
administration. 
On remand in Rasul, in light of Justice O'Connor's language in Hamdi 
limiting the government's burden of proof and citing the possibility of military 
tribunals, the Department of Defense quickly established "Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals" as the forum for detainees.216  These tribunals implement the 
limited review procedures established before the Court's decision—a process 
harshly criticized by human rights groups because the hearings are held in 
secret and the detainees are forbidden access to their own counsel and have no 
right to a neutral judge.217  Rather, detainees are to be helped by government-
selected "personal representatives," who are not lawyers and who will not be 
bound by confidentiality precepts.  Moreover, the detainees can use only 
unclassified information in defense and will be judged by three military 
officers.218  Critics charged that this administration's review policy for 
Guantanamo detainees was "just another attempt to keep Guantanamo a 
lawless enclave." 
6. In Sum 
At first glance, the Court's apparent back-stepping on judicial review echoes 
its approach sixty years ago in Korematsu—first pronouncing heightened 
judicial scrutiny of government restrictions of fundamental liberties and then, in 
application, signaling deference to the government's unsupported, or possibly 
 
 215. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004). 
 216. Reporters Offered Look Inside Combatant Status Review Tribunals, Department of Defense 
Documents, 2004 WL 65724220, Aug. 29, 2004. 
 217. Vanessa Blum, The Other Guantanamo Terror Hearings—Thanks to the Supreme Court, 
Hundreds of Detainees Have Chance to Contest Captivity, LEGAL TIMES Vol. 27, No. 36, Sept. 2, 2004, 
at 1 (citing Michael Ratner of the Center of Constitutional Rights as describing the process as "nasty 
and dishonest"); see also Adam Liptak, Tribunals Rule 4 Rightly Detained; Guantanamo Camp 
Hearings Criticized, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 2004, at A5 (describing the Combat Status 
review Tribunals and the constitutional issues they create); John Hendren, Court Ruling Spurs Review 
of Detainees; The Pentagon Seeks to Ensure Due Process for Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, July 8, 2004, at A4 (citing concerns raised by Amnesty International and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights). 
 218. See supra note 216. 
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even falsified, claim of national security.219  Of course, the setting now differs 
markedly from the circumstances of the legal challenges to the Japanese 
American internment.  The indefinite detention of two citizens and 600 "aliens" 
ostensibly apprehended in Afghanistan's battlefields can be compared only 
mildly to the forced dislocation of 120,000 mostly American citizens from their 
homes on the West Coast and their indefinite incarceration in desolate in-land 
internment prisons.  And today, many civil liberties groups are organized and 
active.  The vehement and widespread public outcry against the 
administration's excesses, and against racial discrimination, distinguishes 
today's national security setting. 
Equally important, the United States now has the original Korematsu case—
its own national security "civil liberties disaster"—and the Korematsu coram 
nobis case revelations of executive national security lies to learn from.  Indeed, 
much of the present-day critical legal advocacy draws on those lessons and on 
Justice Jackson's "loaded weapon" warning. 
Deeper examination, though, reveals four salient common points, then and 
now.  The first commonality is that both specific legal disputes (internment 
then, enemy combatant detentions now) are part of a much larger picture of 
government and public vilification of unpopular groups (systematic hostile 
discrimination against Asian Americans then, harsh treatment of Arabs and 
Muslims in America now)220 during times of national fear (World War II, War 
on Terror).  The second is the tendency of the executive to deliberately 
dissemble to the courts about its national security abuses, particularly when 
those abuses involve the rights of members of unpopular groups.  The third 
common point is the courts' inclination to defer to the executive during times of 
national stress unless the public culture demands heightened judicial scrutiny to 
hold the administration accountable.  The final commonality is the threat to 
democracy and the Constitution posed by the combination of Executive 
national security lies and deferential courts.  The salience of this threat, the 
imperative and illusive nature of this public demand for accountability, and the 
courts' responses, form the heart of a discussion of a rough "strategic blueprint 
for national security accountability." 
 
 219. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited: Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review—Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security 
Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 220. See YAMAMOTO ET AL, supra note 11, at 32-40 (describing the public and legal vilification of 
Asian Americans as the "yellow peril" from the late 1800s through World War II). 
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VI 
EXECUTIVE DISSEMBLING, THE COURTS,  
AND A PROPOSED "BLUEPRINT FOR STRATEGIC ACTION" 
A. National Security Lies and the Case For Heightened Judicial Scrutiny 
Sixty years ago, after fierce internal skirmishing, the U.S. Justice 
Department lied to the Supreme Court about the military necessity basis for the 
Japanese American internment.  As revealed by the Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi coram nobis litigation, officials at the highest levels of the War and 
Justice Departments collaborated to deliberately mislead the Court about the 
"facts" of national security.221 
As the Supreme Court entertained the Korematsu appeal in 1943, the 
Justice Department prepared to ask the high court to take "judicial notice" of 
General DeWitt's Final Report222 as the sole factual basis of the government's 
case on necessity.223  The Final Report stated that disloyal West Coast Japanese 
Americans had committed espionage and sabotage, that there had been 
insufficient time to sort out the loyal from the disloyal, and that therefore all 
Japanese Americans had to be incarcerated indefinitely (without charges, 
hearing or access to counsel).224  Significantly, the Final Report had not been 
submitted to the trial court and DeWitt had not been subjected to cross-
examination.225  According to evidence rules, the Supreme Court could only 
take judicial notice of the Final Report on appeal if its "facts" were "beyond 
dispute."  In essence, by requesting judicial notice of the Final Report, the 
Justice Department was asking the Court to "just trust the executive."  And the 
Court did. 
But, as the coram nobis litigation revealed, General DeWitt, who issued the 
internment orders, fabricated key factual portions of his report and, at the 
demand of the Justice Department, altered other sections to completely hide 
the racist underpinnings of the internment and instead to support the 
government's planned argument of military urgency.226  Contrary to the Final 
Report's accounts, there had been no espionage or sabotage by Japanese 
Americans.  DeWitt had been informed of this unequivocally by the FBI, FCC 
and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).227 
 
 221. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 828 F.2d 591, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 222. Office of the Commanding General Presidio of San Francisco, Final Report: Japanese 
Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942, available at http://www.wwiihistoryclass.com/civilrights/text/ 
goverment_internment_docs/1942_pro-evacation.pdf (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 223. See Yamamoto, supra note 219, at 18. 
 224. See Id. at 10. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 227. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Burling wrote to 
Solicitor General Fahy adamantly stating that General DeWitt knew his Final Report recited key 
factual falsehoods. "[T]he most important statements of fact advanced by General DeWitt to justify the 
evacuation and detention were incorrect, and furthermore that General DeWitt had cause to know, 
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In addition to these "intentional falsehoods"—so characterized by the 
Justice Department attorney responsible for drafting the Department's brief to 
the Court in Korematsu228—DeWitt also altered the most important section of 
the original version of his Final Report concerning the internment's rationale.  
The first completed and bound version of DeWitt's Final Report stated that the 
internment was necessary not because "there was insufficient time" to hold 
individual loyalty hearings.  It was necessary because racial affinities and 
cultural traits meant that no one could discern the loyal Japanese Americans 
from the disloyal—"it was impossible to separate the sheep from the goats."229 
Recognizing that DeWitt's actual racist rationale would definitively 
undermine the government's legal position, the Justice Department fought 
DeWitt to get him to change his completed report.230  Under protest, DeWitt 
relented.  The War Department recalled all the distributed copies of the 
original Final Report.  DeWitt then altered it dramatically to support the 
government's argument that espionage combined with "insufficiency of time" 
justified the mass incarceration—turning inside out DeWitt's actual rationale.231  
(DeWitt then, as ordered, destroyed the original versions of his Final Report—
except one, and related correspondence, which formed part of the foundation 
for the coram nobis cases). 
Equally important, the Justice Department suppressed vehement 
protestations by the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover and FCC head James Fly that the 
Final Report's statements about Japanese American espionage and sabotage 
were false and that DeWitt knew them to be false at the time of his internment 
orders and at the time he signed his report.232  The Justice Department also hid 
from Supreme Court view the official report of the Office and Naval 
Intelligence.  Designated by President Roosevelt as the lead intelligence agency 
on the West Coast "Japanese Problem," the ONI's two-year study concluded in 
early 1942 that there were no grounds for a mass racial internment and that 
there was no reason to treat Japanese Americans differently from German or 
Italian Americans.  DeWitt ignored the ONI's report in ordering the 
internment and omitted reference to it in his Final Report.233 
 
and in all probability did know, that they were incorrect at the time he embodied them in his final 
report." Memorandum from Burling to Fahy, April 13, 1944, reprinted in PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT 
WAR 285 (1993). 
 228. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1418. 
 229. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598.  See also  IRONS, supra note 227, at 208. 
 230. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598. 
 231. Id. at 598.  See also IRONS, supra note 227, at 210. 
 232. See Yamamoto, supra note 219, at 15-16. 
 233. Id. at 16.  Indeed, in 1983, after a thorough two-year investigation, the congressionally 
established Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians determined that there had 
no military necessity and that the causes of the internment were "race prejudice, war hysteria and a 
failure of political leadership."  COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION 
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 18 (1982). 
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Because of these pivotal "intentional falsehoods,"234 the two Justice 
Department attorneys drafting the Korematsu brief launched an internal war to 
prevent the Justice Department from submitting the Final Report to the Court 
or to alert the Court to DeWitt's dissembling on crucial facts.  Through a slew 
of memoranda the attorneys reached the Department's top echelons, including 
the Attorney General and Solicitor General, arguing that it was unethical to lie 
to the Court and wrong to continue the racial incarceration of 100,000 innocent 
people.235 
Politics intervened.  Abandoning the DeWitt Final Report would mean no 
"factual" basis to support the government's claim of necessity—a political 
disaster.  After intense in-fighting, high level Justice Department attorneys 
prevailed.  Without acknowledging the Report's fabrications, the Department 
submitted DeWitt's altered Final Report to the Court.  During oral argument 
Justice Jackson asked the Solicitor General about rumors of key falsehoods in 
the DeWitt Report—whether the "facts" recited in it were contested and 
therefore not subject to judicial notice by the Court.  The Solicitor General 
replied that the Report proved the basis for the internment and  that "no 
 
 234. In her book In Defense of Internment: The Case for "Racial Profiling" in World War II and the 
War on Terror, Michelle Malkin does not explain these extraordinary falsehoods advocated by the 
government, nor the long dark history of anti-Asian public sentiment and "yellow peril" discriminatory 
laws on the West Coast that laid the foundation for the internment as a "popular" political act.  
Instead, she defends the internment by referring to a handful (among thousands) of Japanese 
intelligence "Magic" cables that neither General DeWitt nor the War or Justice Departments thought 
were significant enough to cite to the Supreme Court in making the legal case for the internment.  The 
"Magic cables" were intercepted messages sent from Japanese diplomats to the Japanese consulate in 
America.  Few out of thousands of messages indicated Japan's intent to recruit Japanese Americans as 
part of an espionage network.  None indicated success at that recruitment. See MICHELLE MALKIN, IN 
DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2004).  Malkin nevertheless argues what neither the military nor the Justice Department 
argued, and what no extant government legal documents advocated—that these few and ambiguous 
cables justified the internment of an entire race of Americans on the West Coast.  Michelle Malkin, 
Rethinking the Wisdom of Japanese-American Internment, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 9, 2004, 
at A11 available at http://starbulletin.com/2004/08/09/editorial/commentary.html (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
Malkin's purpose in attempting to validate the World War II internment appears to be to legitimate 
racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims in America today.  She advocates profiling on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, religion or nationality, arguing that "inconvenience" to those detained is preferable to second 
terrorist attack.  Michelle Malkin, Racial Profiling: A Matter of Survival, USATODAY, Aug. 17, 2004, at 
A13. 
The Ninth Circuit considered and soundly rejected the Magic cables argument in the Hirabayashi 
coram nobis case.  See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).  Critics also point out 
that Malkin's arguments are based on a distortion of history.  She ignores "the disparate treatment" 
between demonstrably disloyal European descendants who "received individual hearings," and 
Japanese Americans who were interned "without due process of law."  See David Forman, Rethinking 
the Wisdom of Japanese American Internment, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 9, 2004, at A11, 
available at http://starbulletin.com/2004/08/09/editorial/commentary.html (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems).  Most important, according to Fred Korematsu, Malkin's version fails to 
address the reality and "dangers of racial and ethnic scapegoating" during times of national fear.  Fred 
Korematsu, Do We Really Need to Relearn the Lessons of Japanese American Internment?, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 16, 2004, at B9. 
 235. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 828 F.2d 591, 602 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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responsible person in government had ever taken a contrary position"236—an 
outright national security lie by the highest ranking attorney for the United 
States. 
In light of the falsified DeWitt "evidence" and the swirling rumors about 
Justice Department dissembling, the Supreme Court could have exercised 
"watchful care" over constitutional liberties and called the executive to 
account—that is, to come forward with bona fide evidence of necessity.  
Instead, despite the Korematsu opinion's language of strict scrutiny, the Court 
chose to defer to the administration.  Evincing extreme deference, cast in a 
double negative, the Court declared that it "could not reject as unfounded" the 
government's national security claim.237 
As a prelude to his "loaded weapon" warning, Justice Jackson excoriated 
the majority for its blind acceptance of what turned out to be executive lies: 
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in necessity?  No 
evidence whatever on that subject has been taken by this or any other court. . . . So the 
Court, having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's 
own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he 
did was reasonable.238 
The national security-civil liberties internment debacle stands amid a history of 
other "civil liberties disasters" during times of national stress.239  That long and 
deep history makes a compelling case for heightened judicial scrutiny whenever 
 
 236. See Yamamoto, supra note 219, at 16. 
 237. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944). 
 238. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 239. See generally Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. 
VA. L.  REV. 571 (2002). The Alien and Sedition Acts drafted in 1798 empowered the President to 
deport any non-citizen he judged to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.  See 
JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NATION IN CRISIS (Yale 
Univ. Press 1993).  The Act accorded individuals detained no right to a hearing, no right to present 
evidence and no right to judicial review. 
During the Civil War, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus on eight separate occasions. The 
country was at war with itself, and security in the north was perceivably necessary.  A year after the war 
ended, the Supreme Court held, in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), that Lincoln 
overstepped his constitutional authority and could not suspend the writ of habeas corpus even during a 
time of war.  The Court dismissed the Government's argument that during times of war, the Executive 
Branch has a right to act as the, "supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executive."  Id. at 14. 
The Espionage Act of 1917 was enacted by the Congress and molded by prosecutors and federal 
judges to prohibit subversive opposition.  The nation experienced widespread opposition and 
dissention regarding World War I and the draft.  President Wilson had no tolerance for what he called 
disloyalty and believed that those disloyal "had sacrificed their right to civil liberties."  PAUL L. 
MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 53 (1979).  
The government prosecuted more than 2,000 dissenters who opposed the war and the draft. The non-
tolerance for dissenters led to the creation of the Sedition Act of 1918.  The Act declared it unlawful 
for anyone to circulate material intended to create disdain for the government's policies.  See Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (all upholding convictions stemming from the Sedition Act).  The Congress 
ultimately repealed the Sedition Act of 1918.  The Supreme Court, during the next few decades and 
long after the detainment, reversed every one of its decisions. 
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the government claims "national security" as the justification for curtailing 
fundamental liberties.240 
B. "Strategic Blueprint" Revisited 
In light of the Korematsu history of White House dissembling on national 
security matters, and with illumination from the pre-9/11 Wen Ho Lee 
prosecution and the post-9/11 enemy combatant detention cases, this essay 
returns to its larger theme: What impels the courts in controversial cases to 
carry out their constitutional duties—to hold the executive accountable for 
oftentimes politically popular excesses?  More particularly, what impels courts 
ruling on a national security-civil liberties challenges sometimes to choose 
"heightened scrutiny" of the executive's national security claim, thereby 
requiring the government to seriously account for its actions, rather than to 
choose (as is more often the case) "minimal scrutiny," thereby deferring to the 
government's explanation without real proof? 
As revealed by the enemy combatant cases, and contrary to conventional 
teaching, the crucial judicial choice between heightened or minimal scrutiny is 
not a neutral, politics-free aspect of the legal process.  As mentioned at the 
outset, that choice is influenced only in part by traditional yet malleable legal 
methods.  Often the tipping point in a court's selection of heightened scrutiny in 
a controversial case comes from the dynamic mix of critical legal advocacy and 
organized public pressure.  That critical advocacy and public pressure are 
influential when they combine to create in the public culture a compelling sense 
that it must be the courts that exercise "watchful care" over our liberties during 
times of national distress. 
More specifically, this "compelling sense in the public culture" aims to press 
the court handling a controversial national security case to exercise vigilance by 
undertaking four process tasks—tasks separate from rendering judgment on the 
specific legal claims in the case.  The first is for the court to employ tools of 
critical legal inquiry to unearth and then explain what is really going on in the 
controversy and to articulate what is at stake politically and socially.  The 
second and related task is for the court to acknowledge that sometimes a 
presidential administration distorts information and even lies to unduly expand 
its power and to shield national security abuses from public view.  The third 
task is for the court to recognize that traditional legal analysis, often largely 
devoid of context and visible value judgments, does not itself dictate a politics-
 
 240.  I advanced this argument and proposed a method of judicial implementation shortly after the 
coram nobis cases in 1986.  See Yamamoto, supra note 219, at 41-43 (proposing that, "[e]xcept as to 
actions under civilly[ ]declared martial law, the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of 
civil liberties of Americans is not altered or attenuated by the government's contention that 'military 
necessity' or 'national security' justifies the challenged restrictions.")  I also predicted then that during 
the next national security crisis the government would again tell national security lies and 
simultaneously pressure the courts to defer and "just trust the executive."  The remainder of this essay 
does not replay the jurisprudential argument for heightened judicial scrutiny.  Rather, it addresses the 
corollary Realpolitik question of implementation. 
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free, neutral result.  The court must examine and illuminate social value 
judgments, philosophical commitments, political concerns, as well as 
perceptions of the government's role in the immediate controversy. 
In this light, the fourth task is for the court to carefully and openly scrutinize 
executive actions with dual goals in mind: to afford the executive broad leeway 
in most of its effort to protect the nation's people, and simultaneously to call 
the executive to account publicly for apparent transgressions.  And, as Judge 
Doumars observed in Hamdi and as the Second Circuit echoed in Padilla, when 
those transgressions curtail fundamental liberties under the possibly false 
mantle of national security, the call for an accounting requires the executive to 
proffer bona fide evidence of the danger posed by those targeted and the 
appropriateness of the government's restrictions.  Genuine secrets, of course, 
can be handled discreetly—for example, through in-camera review and under 
seal.  But an executive's bald claims of "confidentiality" or "security risk" 
should not trigger a hands-off judicial posture. 
C. Wen Ho Lee: Post-Release Civil Suit to Unseal Records on Racial 
Prosecution 
The Wen Ho Lee case sheds light on the salutary impact of public 
pressure—particularly in the form of critical legal advocacy and grassroots 
efforts—on the courts' willingness to call the executive to account for apparent 
national security lies.  At the same time, the case reveals that when the public 
spotlight dims the courts might be less willing or able to hold an 
administration's feet to the fire and might instead retreat into the realm of 
judicial deference.  The post-plea bargain civil suit to unseal government 
records in Dr. Lee's case in light of his selective racial prosecution charge is 
illustrative of this latter dynamic. 
After Dr. Lee's release and Judge Parker's apology, Chinese for Affirmative 
Action (CAA)241 demanded the "truth" about Justice Department racial 
profiling.  It filed an unusual civil suit asking the federal court to unseal 
prosecution records, arguing that "CAA and the public have a constitutional 
and common law right of access to pretrial documents filed in a criminal case."  
The CAA aptly framed the importance of public access in terms of judicial 
accountability. 
Public access promotes trustworthiness in the judicial process, helps curb abuses, and 
provides the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, 
including a better perception of its fairness. . . .  Public access is especially important 
 
 241. CAA is an Asian American civil rights service organization committed to multiracial 
democracy. Memorandum Brief In Support Of Motion To Intervene And Unseal, Or, In The 
Alternative, Petition for Writ of Mandamus Compelling Unsealing of Court Records at 2, June 18, 
2001, (No. CR 99-1417 JP) available at http://www.caasf.org/WHL/w_motion.pdf (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems).  Dina Shek contributed substantially to the research and writing on the 
CAA suit. 
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here where secrecy and unaccountability caused the Court itself to be "led astray" by 
the Executive Branch.242 
The Justice Department responded that national security would be threatened 
by unsealing the documents.  To maintain the judicial sealing, the CAA 
countered, a court must "find that there is a substantial probability that national 
security will in fact be harmed absent sealing."243  The CAA argued that this 
standard for sealing was especially appropriate because Judge Parker already 
had indicated that the Justice Department "led him astray" and because "the 
Executive Branch continues to exploit its near-total control over the 
information about Dr. Lee's case."244  The CAA also emphasized the danger of 
extreme judicial deference to the Executive in times of national crisis: "History 
teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to 'national security' may be used 
to justify a wide variety of repressive government actions."245 
Op-ed pieces supported the CAA, calling for a public investigation of the 
Justice Department through the court's power to call the government to 
account.246  In an extraordinary move, Judge Parker in the civil suit ordered the 
government to produce documents relating to Dr. Lee's selective racial 
prosecution charge—a victory for Dr. Lee and the CAA, a victory for those 
pushing for administration accountability and a judiciary exercising "watchful 
care" over citizens' liberties; but a Pyrrhic victory, nevertheless.  Under the 
court's order, the Justice Department selected the documents to be disclosed.  
It also determined which portions of disclosed documents would be redacted.  
Might the Justice Department have had an incentive and the cultural space to 
withhold crucial government documents showing a lack of "necessity"—just as 
the Justice Department lawyers did sixty years ago in the Supreme Court 
appeal in Korematsu?  And if they did, how would Dr. Lee, or the court, know?  
As revealed by the Korematsu and Hirabayashi coram nobis litigation in the 
1980s, it took forty years to discover the government documents showing that 
General DeWitt, who issued the internment orders, and the Justice Department 
had deliberately falsified the facts of "necessity" to the Supreme Court. 
In the CAA suit, the Justice Department eventually selected and produced 
771 pages of documents.  The documents included former head investigator 
Vrooman's previously disclosed declaration charging unwarranted ethnic 
profiling in the Lee investigation.  None of the other documents were the 
 
 242. Id. at 5. 
 243. Id. at 16. 
 244. Reply To Government's Response to Motion to Intervene and Unseal Or, In The Alternative, 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Compelling Unsealing of Court Records, at 5, August 17, 2001, (No. 
CR 99-1417 JP) available at http://www.caasf.org/WHL/w_motion-reply.pdf (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
 245. CAA Memorandum Brief In Support Of Motion To Intervene And Unseal, Or, In The 
Alternative, Petition for Writ of Mandamus Compelling Unsealing of Court Records, supra note 241, at 
13, June 18, 2001, (No. CR 99-1417 JP) (citing In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383, 391 (4th Cir. 1986)) 
available at http://www.caasf.org/WHL/w_motion.pdf (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems) 
 246. See Thomas W. Joo, What, If Not Race, Tagged Lee?, L.A.TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at B13; 
Thomas W. Joo, A Vanishing Security Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at A26. 
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smoking gun on racial profiling that the CAA was searching for.  The Justice 
Department maintained that it complied with the judge's order.  Neither the 
CAA nor Judge Parker had enough information to challenge that assertion.  
Both ultimately deferred.  By this time public organizing and media attention 
waned, and the public steam for pressing forward evaporated.  If any smoking 
gun documents were buried in the government's files, as there had been in 
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, they remained hidden. 
Both the CAA and the government spun the document disclosure as 
victories.  Dr. Lee's supporters continued to celebrate his release and turned 
efforts toward obtaining a presidential pardon.  The government continued to 
imply Dr. Lee's guilt and to deny improper racial profiling.247  In the end, Dr. 
Lee won his freedom and a degree of public vindication.  But with diminishing 
media and public interest, administration accountability for its national security 
dissembling sank below the public radar.  And despite whistle-blowing by 
former insiders Vrooman and Washington and Judge Parker's disclosure order, 
government investigators and lawyers stood firm and avoided a full public 
accounting. 
D. Hamdi and Padilla and the Role of the Media in Judicial Accountability 
1. Nonpartisan Challenges and Internal White House Dissent 
The complex mix of advocacy, media, and the courts also played out at 
varying points in the enemy combatant cases.248  The mainstream media did 
report on the Patriot Act and the enemy combatant cases.  But, its coverage 
focused far less on exposing what was really going on than on articulating the 
Bush administration's positions on its war on terror.  Significantly, the media 
initially failed to articulate the political and social implications of the 
administration's policies. 249 
 
 247. See Washington Post, Report Absolves Government of Racism in Lee Case, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 
8, 2001, at A3; Robert Scheer, The Persecution of Wen Ho Lee, Redux, THE NATION, (Aug. 7, 2000), 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010806&s=20010807 (on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems); see also CAA Statement Regarding U.S. Department of Justice, "Bellows 
Report," at www.caasf.org/WHL/pr_whlbellows081301.html (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems).  The Justice Department leaked the Bellows Report in August, 2001. The internal Justice 
Department report was completed in May of 2000, while Dr. Lee's prosecution continued.  The report 
concluded that there was "no evidence of racial bias."  That conclusion is highly suspect.  The Bellows 
Report ignored the crucial testimony of Vrooman and Washington, and its conclusions were drawn 
months before Judge Parker's order compelling government disclosure of materials related to selective 
prosecution. 
 248. See Section V, supra, in which several others are discussed. 
 249. See Jacques Steinberg, Washington Post Rethinks Its Coverage of War Debate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2004, at A5.  The article discusses the reassessment by The Washington Post, The New York 
Times, and The New Republic of their coverage of the Iraq war, noting that in May 2004, the New York 
Times' "editors acknowledged that in the run-up to war they had not been skeptical enough about 
articles that depended 'at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, defectors and 
exiles bent on 'regime change' in Iraq whose credibility has come under increasing public debate.'" 
Lori Baker contributed significantly to this section's research and writing on the role of the media.  Id. 
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The mainstream media also failed to investigate and expose "in the months 
after 9/11 [that] there were fierce debates—and even shouting matches—inside 
the White House over the treatment of Americans with suspected al Qaeda 
ties."250  The face-off pitted administration hardliners such as Vice President 
Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Cheney's chief counsel David 
Addington, and deputy White House Counsel Flanagan against Attorney 
General Ashcroft, Solicitor General Olson, and other senior administration 
lawyers.  The former argued that in wartime the President's power to detain 
enemy combatants to protect the country was virtually limitless.  The latter 
took a more pragmatic approach, urging the President to consider public 
opinion and the policy's likelihood of withstanding judicial review.251 
In light of the Bush administration's efforts to market itself as resolute and 
united, this internal dissonance should have been big news.  Alternative media 
reported on the controversy.252  The mainstream media laid low.  And a fearful 
public remained generally supportive of the administration's policy without 
crucial information—an example of what David Brock, former neoconservative 
journalist, terms the established media's "censoring of the news" in shaping 
national political understandings.253 
2. Media Coverage of the War on Terror Seeps Into the Courtroom 
Media reporting and commentary affects public political perceptions.  But 
does media reporting, along with critical legal advocacy, help shape a public 
culture that affects judicial scrutiny of a controversy?  Carefully crafted media 
events during the heat of Supreme Court consideration of the enemy combatant 
cases suggest this is so—or at least that political decisionmakers and lawyers 
believe it to be so.  In particular, as also suggested by the "Strategic Blueprint," 
these events support the perception that courts are at times influenced by media 
coverage of the war on terror. 
After oral argument in the enemy combatant cases appeared to go poorly 
for the Justice Department, and days before the Court's anticipated ruling, the 
administration suddenly declassified ostensibly incriminating statements made 
 
 250. Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, The Road to the Brig, NEWSWEEK, April 26, 2004, at 26 
(emphasis added). 
 251. Id.  Also skeptical of the hardliners' approach were two former top Justice Department 
officials.  Viet Dinh, former head of the department's Office of Legal Policy and a chief architect of the 
USA Patriot Act, and Michael Chertoff, former head of the department's criminal division, criticized 
the administration's ad hoc approach to designating enemy combatants.  Both warned that the 
administration's approach would be "unsustainable" unless a framework was established for 
"determining when, why and for how long someone may be detained as an enemy combatant, and what 
judicial review should be available." Richard B. Schmitt, Patriot Act Author Has Concerns; Detaining 
citizens as "enemy combatants"—a policy not spelled out in the act—is flawed, the legal scholar says., 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, at A1. 
 252. See, e.g., THE NATION (reported extensively on the controversy). 
 253. BROCK, supra note 60, at 12 (describing generally the mainstream media's "censoring of the 
news" to shape national conversations). 
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by Padilla—statements not part of the court record subject to formal rebuttal.254  
A fusillade of criticism followed.255 
Deputy Attorney General James Comey adamantly denied that the 
administration was trying to influence Supreme Court deliberations.256  Legal 
commentators thought otherwise, indicating that this denial was another White 
House lie.257  Most important in terms of the "Strategic Blueprint," those 
commentators' statements implicitly recognized that the judges pay attention to 
media reports and that the legal community believes that judges in 
controversial cases can be subtly influenced by trials in the court of pubic 
opinion. 
The government disclosures this week were not compelled by any court, statute or 
deadline.  It was purely a political decision that the president would benefit by 
selectively releasing incriminating statements allegedly made by a citizen held 
incommunicado.258 
This Hail Mary press conference was directed . . . particularly to Associate Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor who, during oral arguments, was the most conflicted of the 
justices in the closely divided court.259 
This was a shameful effort to sway the Supreme Court.260 
The justices don't live in solitary confinement, and this will certainly have an impact 
on them. . . . 261 
While the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the enemy combatant 
cases, stories of American forces abusing Iraqi prisoners saturated the 
worldwide media.  Notably, during argument, Justices' questions linked the 
torture scandal to the central issue in the enemy combatant cases—who is to 
hold the Executive Branch accountable for abuses.  They queried the 
government's lawyers about what "would be a check against torture."262  
 
 254. See Isikoff et al., supra note 151 ("A newly declassified Pentagon report on Padilla—released 
by Deputy Attorney General James Comey—was in part intended to influence public thinking about 
his case and establish more clearly that Padilla was a dangerous Al Qaeda operative who intended to 
inflict harm on innocent civilians.") 
 255. See Jonathan Turley, You Have Rights—If Bush Says You Do, L.A. TIMES, June, 3, 2004, at 
B11; Hentoff, supra note 152; Frank Davies, Prisoner Abuse May Influence Judges' Ruling on 
Detainees, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, May 14, 2004 (citing Eugene Fidell, director of 
the non-partisan National Institute of Military Justice); see also Isikoff et al., supra note 151. 
 256. See Jess Bravin and Avery Johnson, Bush Discloses Data Aimed At Justifying Holding Padilla, 
WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at B8.  ("Mr. Comey said the timing of the announcement, near the pending 
Supreme Court ruling, was a coincidence."). 
 257. See Turley, supra note 255; Editorial, Skirting the Constitution, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, 
June 6, 2004, available at 2004 WL 81884856. 
 258. Turley, supra note 255. 
 259. Hentoff, supra note 152. 
 260. Id. (quoting statements made by Fox News senior judicial analyst, Judge Andrew Napolitano 
to Bill O'Reilly). 
 261. Davies, supra note 255 (citing Eugene Fidell, director of the non-partisan National Institute of 
Military Justice). 
 262. Transcript of Hearing before Supreme Court, April 28, 2004, at 18, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. 
Ct. 2711 (2004).  In another exchange, at the Hamdi oral argument, Justice Stevens asked Deputy 
Solicitor General Paul Clement, "do you think there is anything in the law that curtails the method of 
interrogation that may be employed?"  Clement responded, "Well . . . I think that the United States is 
signatory to conventions that prohibit torture and that sort of thing.  And the United States is going to 
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Deputy Solicitor General Clement assured the Court that the administration 
was bound by international treaties prohibiting torture.  In early June, while the 
Court was still deliberating, the media disclosed internal administration memos 
showing that the Departments of Defense and Justice had determined before 
oral argument that the United States would not be bound by treaty 
obligations.263  Were the Deputy Solicitor's assurances another White House 
lie? 
Legal observers anticipated that this "outside the record" revelation about 
administration dissembling, like the untimely declassification of Padilla 
documents, would likely affect the Court's deliberations.  Newsweek reported 
that "[t]he conventional wisdom among former Supreme Court clerks" was that 
"recent disclosures of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and internal 
administration memos disavowing compliance with international treaties 
involving treatment of prisoners" would seriously undermine the 
administration's arguments before the Court and would turn "two key swing 
justices—Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy—against it."264 
The actual effect of these media revelations on the Court is unknown.  What 
is known is that the opening of Justice O'Connor's Hamdi opinion resonates 
with the calls of critical legal advocates, scholars, social justice groups, and 
media pundits for the judiciary to draw on the teachings of history and not to 
hand the executive a "blank check." 
E. Concluding Thoughts 
The "Strategic Blueprint for National Security Accountability" proposed in 
Section II is just that, a proposal.  It draws its contours and content from a 
limited universe: the reported advocacy, organizing, media handling, cultural 
setting, and judicial decisionmaking in the Korematsu, Wen Ho Lee, Hamdi, 
Padilla, and Rasul cases; and personal experience.265  The proposal is offered to 
stimulate further jurisprudential and Realpolitik inquiry into the impact of 
critical legal advocacy and public pressure on the crucial threshold judicial task 
of selecting the appropriate level of scrutiny of executive actions.  It is also 
offered as a rough guide for building coalitions and mapping strategy.  Does the 
blueprint serve as an apt guide?  Empirical study awaits.  Can and should it be 
sharpened and improved or revised?  Definitely. 
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Even in its preliminary form the blueprint may be especially valuable for 
those concerned about presidential dissembling and civil liberties because it 
partially unravels the dynamics of the Japanese American internment 
challenges within a post-9/11 national security setting and then teases out 
precepts for strategic action.  The blueprint does this by challenging 
conventional wisdom on several points worthy of summary: The law and legal 
process are not inherently neutral or objective; traditional narrow legal 
arguments are important but often fail to convey what is really going on and 
what is at stake for people and institutions, and that is why judges in 
controversial cases are at times influenced by political currents and off-the-
record general information; public organizing combined with critical legal 
advocacy in instances can shape a cultural milieu that helps impel courts to step 
up and assume the role of "watchful care."  It is by critically re-examining 
analytical precepts and by reframing strategic paths that we learn lessons from 
the internment.266 
One often stated lesson is that "America should prevent a present-day 
internment."  A more important and rarely stated lesson, with far broader 
applicability, is this: Diverse segments of the public must organize, critically 
analyze and speak out to hold the courts accountable for holding the President 
accountable for abuses—both at the "front end" and at the "back end" of 
national security-civil liberties controversies.  Only when the "public" (a wide 
array of individuals, organizations, institutions, and media) is organized and 
critically attuned will courts be impelled both to afford the Executive branch 
broad leeway in most efforts to protect the nation's people and, simultaneously, 
to call the executive branch to account publicly for transgressions of civil 
liberties and human rights under the possibly false mantle of national security. 
Only then can the United States, a democracy marked by its Bill of Rights, 
genuinely say "Mission Accomplished." 
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